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Great Expectations of Privacy: A New
Model for Fourth Amendment Protection
Brian J. Serr*
A Party member lives from birth to death under the eye of the
Thought Police. Even when he is alone he can never be sure that he
is alone. Wherever he may be, asleep or awake, working or resting, in
his bath or in bed, he can be inspected without warning and without
knowing that he is being inspected. Nothing that he does is indiffer-
ent. His friendships, his relaxations, his behavior toward his wife and
children, the expression of his face when he is alone, the words he
mutters in sleep, even the characteristic movements of his body, are
all jealously scrutinized. Not only any actual misdemeanor, but any
eccentricity, however small, any change of habits, any nervous man-
nerism that could possibly be the symptom of an inner struggle, is
certain to be detected. He has no freedom of choice in any direction
whatever.
1
The preceding passage describes the life of Winston Smith,
the main character in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, a
shocking post-World War II vision of a future world where indi-
vidual privacy and freedom were virtually nonexistent due to
the spectre of Big Brother, a nameless face that served as a fig-
urehead for a government that subjected citizens to intrusive,
round-the-clock surveillance as a means of ensuring orthodoxy
and perpetuating its own power.2 Fortunately, to the extent
Orwell's chosen title was a prediction, he was grossly prema-
ture. His novel remains, however, a thought-provoking excur-
sion into a world without constitutional limitations on
government intrusion into intimate realms of personal privacy.
In short, Orwell envisioned a society without a fourth amend-
ment to protect citizens against unreasonable government
searches and seizures.3
Underlying the fourth amendment's prohibition of unrea-
* Associate Professor, Baylor University Law School.
1. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 211-12 (1949).
2. See id
3. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
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sonable government searches and seizures is the eternal tension
between governmental power and individual rights. In the
fourth amendment context, this struggle pits the government's
power to detect and redress violations of its laws against an in-
dividual's interest in a private life free from government intru-
sion.4 In Orwell's futuristic society, the conflict was resolved
entirely in favor of the government at the expense of the indi-
vidual. The prospect of living in such a world is chilling. Nev-
ertheless, it is equally disturbing to contemplate life in a world
where personal freedoms are so limitless that the government
is impotent in its efforts to control crime. The Supreme Court's
task in interpreting the fourth amendment is to balance these
two conflicting interests in a manner that promotes both. In
the last decade, however, the Court's means of promoting law
enforcement interests has tipped the balance unnecessarily fur-
ther and further away from individual freedom, significantly di-
minishing the realm of personal privacy.
The Supreme Court continued this trend in a recent case
involving-somewhat humorously, at first glance-government
forays into garbage. With the recent declaration of war on
drugs, law enforcement authorities have become increasingly
interested in the contents of some people's refuse. Identifying
the garbage of a particular individual and methodically search-
ing and inventorying its contents can reveal important informa-
tion about that person's life style, personal habits, and
associates.5
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. The Supreme Court expressly recognized the struggle between gov-
ernmental authority and individual privacy early in the course of fourth
amendment jurisprudence. In 1921, the Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures .... Its origin and history clearly show that it
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmen-
tal agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property ....
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
5. An analysis of famous celebrities' trash led one writer-reporter to ob-
serve: "You are what you throw away." See Wederman, The Art of Garbage
Analysis: You Are What You Throw Away, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1971, at 113, 113;
see also Rathje, Archaeological Ethnography... Because Sometimes It Is Better
to Give Than to Receive, in EXPLORATIONS IN ETHNOARCHAEOLOGY, 49, 54 (R.
Gould ed. 1978) (quoting renowned archaeologist Emil Haury as once saying:




Just as trash reveals much about its disposer, the Supreme
Court's recent opinion on the fourth amendment implications
of systematic government searches of trash-California v.
Greenwood 0-speaks volumes about the future scope of the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In Greenwood, police opened and searched a sealed,
opaque plastic garbage bag that the garbage collector had
turned over to the police at their request.7 The police discov-
ered evidence of criminality in the garbage bag, leading to sub-
sequent searches and the discovery of additional evidence.s The
California state courts decided that the police obtained all the
evidence in violation of Greenwood's fourth amendment rights
and dismissed the prosecution.9 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that government searches of garbage
are not "searches" within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment,1 0 thereby rendering the amendment's protections inap-
plicable to such investigations. According to the Court, a
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded
items, regardless of the intimate nature of the refuse.11
Although Justice Brennan, in dissent, emphatically argued
that the Court's holding would shock most American citizens,
1 2
the outcome is anything but shocking to fourth amendment
scholars who have been following the trend of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.13 Indeed, the Court's holding in Greenwood is
completely consistent with recent interpretations of the
breadth of fourth amendment protection.
14
With the Supreme Court's recent laissez faire attitude to-
ward law enforcement searches and seizures, government in-
vestigatory techniques threaten to intrude more and more on
the privacies of everyday life. Where we go, who we see, who
we call, what we do in our backyards, what we read, and the
contents of intimate letters we have thrown away are all in-
6. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
7. Id. at 1627.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1628.
10. Id. at 1628-29.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. See Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expecta-
tion of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1294-95, 1298-1329 (1981); Tomkovicz,
Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth
Amendment Privacy Promise, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 648-694 (1985); Wilkins,
Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" An Emerging Tripartite
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1086-1107 (1987).
14. See infra notes 68-144 and accompanying text.
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creasingly subject to unlimited government supervision, uncon-
strained by constitutional safeguards. Government officials can
peek at these aspects of our lives as often as they want, for as
long as they want, whenever they want, because the Supreme
Court has held that there is no fourth amendment protection
whatsoever from such diverse government investigatory tech-
niques as the tracking of vehicles,15 searching of trash bags,16
air surveillance of private property,17 or tracing of phone
calls.18
When the Supreme Court rules that a particular form of
governmental surveillance does not implicate the fourth
amendment, the result is that the government can use that
form of surveillance to gather and record intimate information
about anyone, at any time, for as long as the government
desires.1 9 Each such ruling raises the issue of whether society
can trust police and other government officials not to abuse the
15. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that govern-
ment's use of electronic transmitter to monitor individual's travels does not
constitute fourth amendment search). For an extended discussion of Knotts
and its fourth amendment significance, see infra notes 83-95 and accompany-
ing text.
16. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29. For a thorough analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision in Greenwood, see infra notes 145-81 and accompa-
nying text.
17. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (holding that police
airplane flight over individual's fenced backyard is not search for fourth
amendment purposes). For a complete discussion of Ciraolo and its fourth
amendment ramifications, see infra notes 118-44 and accompanying text.
18. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that police use
of tracing devices to determine whom individuals call and when does not im-
plicate fourth amendment protections). For an extended analysis of Smith,
see infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
19. Of course, the practical considerations of time and money effect some
limit on intrusive governmental practices. For example, due to excessive ex-
pense, if for no other reason, the government's absolute freedom to look
through everyone's garbage is unlikely to result in large scale trash searches
directed against masses of the population. Nevertheless, the right to be secure
from unreasonable government intrusion is an individual right, not just a col-
lective right. Moreover, absent fourth amendment constraints, the govern-
ment certainly does have the resources available to destroy the privacy of
selected persons, although the reasons for choosing a particular person may be
discriminatory, vindictive, or completely arbitrary. It was this very distrust of
government that led to the adoption of the fourth amendment. See Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Moreover, the law-particularly interpre-
tations of constitutional rights-must be flexible enough to redress obvious
wrongs. Thus, when analyzing the issue of whether any fourth amendment
protection should be available for a particular activity, one must recognize that
withholding fourth amendment protection is tantamount to telling govern-




new power that the Supreme Court has granted to them.20
This Article will show that the entire course of recent
Supreme Court fourth amendment precedent, which has nar-
rowed significantly the scope of individual activities that are
protected constitutionally, is misguided and inconsistent with
the spirit of the fourth amendment. First, however, it is neces-
sary to clarify the issue. Fourth amendment analysis consists of
three basic steps. The first step involves determining whether
the government activity at issue constitutes a "search" implicat-
ing fourth amendment protection.2 1 Next, taking into consider-
ation the nature of both the governmental conduct and the
individual's privacy interest, the Court must determine how
much protection is necessary to ensure that the government
search in question is "reasonable. '22 Finally, given an unrea-
sonable, and thus illegal, search-a search performed in the ab-
sence of those protections required in the second step-the
Court must decide whether to apply the exclusionary remedy
to the fruits of the search.2 3
This Article proposes a test that will broaden the scope of
citizens' activities that are protected under the first step of
fourth amendment analysis. Nevertheless, this proposal will
not inevitably tip the balance against law enforcement officials,
because the Court can vary the amount of protection for a
given search under the second step of the analysis. The fourth
amendment has never absolutely precluded government offi-
cials from interfering with an individual's privacy interests.24
20. Cf Comment, A Privacy Based Analysis for Warrantless Aerial Sur-
veillance Cases, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1767, 1781-86 (1987), (describing effect of
governmental surveillance).
21. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 16-20 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-68 (1966).
22. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-31 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967).
23. The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is the settled remedy for
fourth amendment violations. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(holding that, in federal prosecutions, fourth amendment bans use of evidence
obtained through illegal search and seizure); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in vio-
lation of Constitution is inadmissible in state court). The purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter government violations of individuals' fourth
amendment rights by removing the incentive to disregard those rights. Mapp,
367 U.S. at 656 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
Whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a particular case implicates issues
such as the "good faith exception" and the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine, both of which have received extensive commentary and are outside the
scope of this Article.
24. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). After deciding that
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Rather, ruling that the fourth amendment protects an individ-
ual in his or her home, backyard, travels, or discarded personal
items simply means that governmental investigative activity
must be "reasonable,"25 hardly a draconian requirement. The
law is replete with the requirement that people act reasonably.
For example, unreasonable conduct can lead to civil liability in
tort,28 unreasonable medical care can lead to malpractice
suits, 2 7  and unreasonable laws may be overturned as
unconstitutional.28
In the fourth amendment context, reasonable generally
means that police must obtain a warrant based on probable
cause before conducting a search.29 Supreme Court precedent,
however, contains many examples of "reasonable" police inves-
tigations performed without a warrant 30 or without probable
governmental monitoring of phone conversations was a search implicating
fourth amendment protections, the Court held the search unreasonable, and
therefore unlawful, only because it was conducted without a warrant. Had the
agents obtained a warrant based on probable cause and observed any restric-
tions that the warrant imposed on them, the "search" of the telephone calls
would have been perfectly constitutional. Id. at 354-59.
25. The fourth amendment expressly provides: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (em-
phasis added).
26. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 145-49 (4th ed.
1971).
27. See id at 161-66.
28. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1439 (2d ed. 1988)
("The Supreme Court, from its earliest examination of socioeconomic regula-
tion, has considered that equal protection demands reasonableness in legisla-
tive and administrative classifications.").
29. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
30. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1987) (reaffirming
"plain view seizure" rule, which allows officers to make warrantless seizure of
evidence inadvertently discovered in plain view, so long as there is probable
cause to believe that item is subject to seizure); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that warrantless searches are reasonable
when individual has consented to search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-63 (1969) (holding that police may, without first obtaining warrant, under-
take full search of arrestee's person for weapons and evidence so long as
search is contemporaneous with arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968)
(holding that it is reasonable for police to make warrantless search of person
for weapons through a body frisk if, during lawful encounter with that individ-
ual, police have reasonable fear for safety of themselves or others); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (recognizing so-called "exigent circum-
stances" exception to warrant requirement); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770-71 (1966) (allowing searches without warrant if officer reasonably be-
lieves that delay necessary to secure warrant would result in destruction of ev-
idence sought); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-55 (1925) (holding
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cause.31 Thus, a holding that the fourth amendment protects a
particular activity does not automatically require that the po-
lice obtain a warrant based on probable cause before investigat-
ing. The reasonableness requirement is flexible and can
accommodate a much broader interpretation of the fourth
amendment's scope than that which the Supreme Court cur-
rently espouses.
In order to demonstrate how far the current Supreme
Court has strayed from a balanced view of governmental power
and individual privacy in its recent fourth amendment deci-
sions, Part I of this Article examines the historical roots of the
"modern" fourth amendment. After analyzing Katz v. United
States,32 the case that inaugurated prevailing fourth amend-
ment doctrine, Part I proposes a construction of the Katz deci-
sion that is consistent with the spirit of the fourth amendment.
Part II critiques selected cases in the last decade of Supreme
Court fourth amendment jurisprudence in order to demon-
strate how the Court consistently has misread and misapplied
the rule of Katz, undercutting its spirit by denying fourth
amendment protections to many aspects of personal life. This
criticism of the Court's interpretation of Katz includes an ex-
planation of why the diminution of personal realms of privacy
is completely unnecessary to serve the Court's goal of promot-
ing effective law enforcement. Finally, Part III proposes a new
model for fourth amendment decision making that will not
only promote a more accurate and logical interpretation of
Katz, but will expand the scope of citizens' rights to privacy
under the fourth amendment without detracting from legiti-
mate law enforcement efforts to detect and prevent crime.
I. KATZ: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Before Katz v. United States,3 3 the Supreme Court's view
that search of car, which is necessarily different from search of home, is rea-
sonable without warrant so long as officers correctly determine that there is
probable cause to search car); see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 356-67 (1974) (discussing warrantless
searches).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding
that police may search person for weapons and evidence automatically upon
effectuating lawful custodial arrest, regardless of probability of discovering
seizable items); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (upholding officer's frisk
of individual for weapons on less than probable cause).




of whether government activity implicated the fourth amend-
ment was quite simple. Because the relevant constitutional lan-
guage prohibits "unreasonable searches," the Court applied
fourth amendment protections only when the police were
"searching," construing that term according to its ordinary dic-
tionary definition. 34 This approach led to some absurd results.
In Olmstead v. United States,35 decided during the prohibition
era, federal officers listened to and recorded phone calls for
several months using a wiretap. The officers tapped the phones
from the basement of an office building and from telephone
lines on streets near the suspects' homes. 36 The government
used the evidence accumulated to convict the suspects of violat-
ing the National Prohibition Act.3 7 The Court in Olmstead read
the fourth amendment narrowly and literally to require an ac-
tual physical searching of places or objects, such as suspects'
houses, offices, personal effects, or the suspects themselves.38
Because the government had obtained the evidence not by
34. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary defines search as follows: "to look into or over carefully or thor-
oughly in an effort to find or discover something." WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 1042 (1973). See also Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 356-57
(reviewing fourth amendment analysis before Katz); Wilkins, supra note 13, at
1081-86 (discussing pre-Katz case law).
35. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 369 U.S. 347
(1967).
36. Id. at 456-57.
37. Id. at 455.
38. The Court observed that:
The [Fourth] Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of
material things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The
description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is
that it must specify the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized.
... The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There
was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry
of the houses or offices of the defendants.
By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its applica-
tion for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with
another at a far distant place. The language of the Amendment can
not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to
the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The interven-
ing wires are not part of his house or office any more than are the
highways along which they are stretched.
Id. at 464-65. In other words, it was not a "search" if government officials lis-
tened but did not look. Although this is perhaps consistent with Webster's
definition at note 34, supra, it is decidedly underinclusive with respect to the
spirit of the fourth amendment as announced in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 475 (1921). See supra note 4.
[Vol. 73:583
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"searching" but through the officers' sense of hearing, the
Court found no fourth amendment implications in the Olin-
stead surveillance.39
A. THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST
The Supreme Court's first attempt to interpret the fourth
amendment according to its spirit rather than its letter oc-
curred in Katz. In that case, FBI agents suspected that Katz
was using a public telephone illegally to transmit gambling in-
formation.40 Without getting a warrant-none was required in
light of Olmstead-the agents placed a listening and recording
device on the outside of the phone booth and monitored Katz's
end of the conversations.41 The judge admitted this evidence at
Katz's trial and the evidence helped convict him.42 The
Supreme Court reversed his conviction, ruling that the record-
ing device intruded on an interest that the fourth amendment
protected.4 3 Thus, because the FBI agents conducted the
"search" without first obtaining a warrant, the search was un-
lawful and its fruits inadmissible in court.4 4
In determining what constitutes a search under the fourth
amendment, the Supreme Court laid to rest the rigid, diction-
ary definition espoused in Olmstead. According to the Katz
opinion, governmental monitoring of telephone conversations is
a "search" for fourth amendment purposes.45 The Court also
rejected Olmstead's requirement of a trespass onto personal
property before fourth amendment rights attach.4 6 Although
both parties in Katz focused their arguments on whether a pub-
lic phone booth is a "constitutionally protected area" such as a
39. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-65.
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
41. Id at 348, 354.
42. Id. at 348.
43. IM. at 353, 359.
44. Id. at 355-57.
45. Id at 353. The Court stated:
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and record-
ing the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifia-
bly relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did
not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitu-
tional significance.
Id.
46. Id. (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)) (" '[t]he
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search
and seize has been discredited' ").
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home,47 the Supreme Court found that term to be misleading.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, explained:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
4 8
Application of this standard to the facts of Katz easily led the
Court to rule that the fourth amendment protected the con-
tents of Katz's phone calls from unreasonable government
eavesdropping. 49
The holding in Katz forever changed the focus of fourth
amendment jurisprudence from whether the police were, in a
literal sense, physically "searching" a constitutionally protected
area to whether the police were intruding on an individual's ex-
pectation of privacy.50 Nevertheless, the Court did not rule
that governmental monitoring of private telephone conversa-
tions was per se unconstitutional, only that the fourth amend-
ment, with its rule of reasonableness, applies to the use of this
surveillance technique.51 Had the FBI obtained a warrant from
a neutral and detached magistrate after a showing of probable
cause that Katz was using the phone for illegal purposes, the
"search" would have been entirely constitutional.52
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, further refined the
majority's new "privacy" standard. Reading the majority's test
as predominantly subjective-whether an individual has know-
ingly exposed something to the public or sought to preserve it
as private-Justice Harlan proposed a twofold requirement. In
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-51.
48. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
49. The Court observed that:
[W]hat [Katz] sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not
the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right
to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he
might be seen.... One who occupies [a public telephone booth], shuts
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call
is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouth-
piece will not be broadcast to the world.
Id. at 352.
50. See California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81
(1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 440 (1976); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973); United States
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-49, 752
(1971); see also infra notes 68-181 and accompanying text (analyzing Court's
post-Katz jurisprudence).
51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
52. See id at 354-56.
[Vol. 73:583
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order for the Court to accord fourth amendment protection to
an activity, "a person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that . . . expectation
[must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 
-53
Illustrating his point, Justice Harlan compared two situa-
tions in which individuals would not be entitled to fourth
amendment protection, one of which fails Justice Harlan's sub-
jective test and one of which fails his objective test. First, a
person generally expects privacy at home, "but objects, activi-
ties, or statements that [the person] exposes to the 'plain view'
of outsiders are not 'protected'" because the person has exhib-
ited no subjective expectation of privacy.54 On the other hand,
the conversations of people talking openly in a public place are
not protected because society would view any expectation of
privacy in such a conversation, even if subjectively held, as un-
reasonable.5 5 Applying his test to the facts of Katz, Justice
Harlan wrote: "The point is not that the booth is 'accessible to
the public' at other times, but that it is a temporarily private
place whose momentary occupants' [subjective] expectations of
freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. ' 56
Justice Harlan's refinement of the test quickly became, and
remains, the prevailing view.5 7 The problem that this test
presents, however, is how to determine which individual activi-
ties society is willing to cloak with a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." The specific holding of Katz that the fourth amend-
ment protects phone conversations is not helpful, because Jus-
tice Harlan's standard essentially calls for a case-by-case
analysis. Moreover, Justice Harlan's reasoning is conclusory.
Katz's expectations of privacy were "reasonable" from a socie-
tal standpoint because Justice Harlan deemed them to be rea-
sonable. In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court continued
to wave Justice Harlan's magic wand without clarifying what it
is that makes an expectation of privacy worthy of fourth
amendment protection.5 8 Thus, it is difficutt to draw conclu-
53. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988); Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
177 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
58. See. e.g., California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-30 (1988); Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-13 (1986). While continually designating
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sions about subsequent Supreme Court faithfulness to Katz
without first formulating a hypothesis regarding the ingredi-
ents of a protectable privacy interest.
B. DEFINING PROTECTABLE PRIVACY INTERESTS UNDER KATZ
Because the fourth amendment by its express terms ap-
plies to governmental conduct that encroaches on individual
privacy and freedom, any attempt to identify the proper scope
of the amendment involves a determination of the point at
which governmental intrusion into the personal lives of individ-
uals should be regulated. This determination is inevitably a
value judgment about which people will disagree. Those people
favoring a broad view of individual freedoms will prefer a broad
scope of constitutional protection.59 Conversely, those who
favor broad police power at the cost of some individual liberty
will prefer a narrow construction of fourth amendment protec-
tion. Judges will make this value judgment according to their
own liberal or conservative views.
This intractable problem begs for a more predictable stan-
dard, preferably a standard promoting a fourth amendment
whose protections do not expand and contract according to the
changing political chemistry of the Supreme Court. Professor
LaFave, the nation's leading authority on the fourth amend-
ment, has suggested that the ultimate inquiry under Katz is
whether allowing the police surveillance technique at issue to
go unregulated by the fourth amendment would reduce the
amount of individual privacy and freedom "to a compass incon-
sistent with the aims of a free and open society. ' ' 60
Justice Harlan's two-part test as the constitutional standard, the Court has
never elaborated what it is that makes a privacy expectation "reasonable" or
"legitimate." Rather, after stating Justice Harlan's test, the Court actually ap-
plies a different test, discussed infra at notes 66, 128-30 and accompanying
text.
59. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 13; Wilkins, supra note 13.
60. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2, at 99 (1985)
[hereinafter LAFAVE] (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 403 (1974)).
Professor LaFave's test requires one slight adjustment. Presumably, Pro-
fessor LaFave did not mean that fourth amendment protection is unwarranted
if police can be trusted not to abuse a particular surveillance technique. If one
assumes such governmental trustworthiness, then police use of surveillance
techniques, unhampered by fourth amendment regulation, certainly would not
diminish the freedoms that are consistent with the aims of American society.
Yet, the history and philosophy underlying the entire Bill of Rights is inconsis-
tent with entrusting individual liberties to an all-powerful government. Be-
cause it was distrust of government that led to the adoption of the Bill of
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Professor LaFave's inquiry not only captures the essence of
the fourth amendment, it also recognizes that a Supreme Court
decision that a particular form of governmental surveillance
does not implicate the fourth amendment is the legal
equivalent of a green light to use that surveillance unreasona-
bly and without limitation. Thus, determining whether there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy involves looking at both the
nature of the individual privacy interest and the degree of in-
trusiveness created by the governmental surveillance, rather
than simply deciding whether a reasonable person would ex-
pect privacy in a particular situation. To illustrate, if two drug
dealers conducted an illegal transaction in the middle of the
night on a dark street corner in a remote part of town, it would
be reasonable for them to expect that the police would not dis-
cover their activities.61 Yet, this is not a "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" under Katz and would not be a "search" for
fourth amendment purposes if an officer were to shine a light
on them and detect the illegal transaction, even if the officer
was walking from corner to corner and, in a dictionary sense,
"searching" for narcotics traffickers. Looking at the minimal
intrusiveness of the governmental surveillance-illuminating a
dark public street corner-and the nature of the individual in-
terest-a street corner transaction-it is difficult to believe that
allowing this form of police conduct to go unregulated by the
fourth amendment would diminish individual privacy and free-
doms to a level inconsistent with the aims of a free society.
Does it matter that police can, without limit, walk around illu-
Rights, see supra note 19, the framers obviously never meant to have the fox
guard the constitutional chicken coop.
Professor LaFave, in enunciating his test, must have meant that fourth
amendment protection is desirable whenever an arbitrary or irresponsible use
of a government surveillance technique would threaten freedoms upon which
our society is based. Thus, in deciding whether the fourth amendment should
regulate particular government intrusions, the proper underlying assumption
is that of a government which cannot be trusted to use its power responsibly,
rather than an assumption of a trustworthy, benevolent government. The
Constitution requires nothing less. In this way, the law regarding individual
rights remains flexible and capable of application to obvious governmental
abuses. The proper inquiry then, adjusted in accordance with this Article, is:
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by police is permitted
to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, an arbitrary or unreasonable
use of that surveillance technique would diminish the amount of privacy re-
maining to citizens to a level inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society.
61. See LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 3.2, at 99 (citing Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 983 (1968)).
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minating dark street corners, as often as they want, whenever
they want? Does society desire to extend fourth amendment
protection to street corner transactions?6 2 The questions are
rhetorical. It would trivialize the fourth amendment to apply it
to this hypothetical situation.
Compare the situation in which a police officer climbs a
tree in a city park, a place he has every right to be, and shines a
flashlight into an individual's bedroom window.6 3 Should po-
lice, bound by no constitutional restraints, freely be able to
peek into bedroom windows? Does society deem bedroom ac-
tivity worthy of fourth amendment protection? In answer to
Professor LaFave's inquiry, allowing this intrusive type of po-
lice surveillance to go unregulated, considering the highly pri-
vate nature of the individual interest,6 4 certainly would
62. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 363, 402 (asking similar
value judgment questions).
63. See id
64. In the analysis proposed in the text of this Article, any assessment of
the nature of the individual interest must be made in the abstract. That is, the
criminal nature of activities performed in a private area should not be consid-
ered in determining whether fourth amendment protection should apply. In
deciding whether to extend fourth amendment protection to bedroom activity,
it is irrelevant whether the individual involved in any particular case is using
his bedroom for sleeping, sexual intimacy, or the manufacture of amphet-
amines. If anyone is to enjoy the assurance of privacy in the bedroom, the
fourth amendment's protections must extend to everyone, criminal or inno-
cent. The very reason that fourth amendment protection generally requires a
warrant based on a judicial determination of probable cause prior to police in-
trusion into a protected interest is to guard against overzealous police conduct.
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (holding that inferences
necessary to any probable cause determination should be drawn by neutral
and detached judicial officers rather than police officers "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"). If police could justify home in-
trusions after the fact based on the illicit use to which the home or bedroom
was put, police overzealousness would be rewarded and the whole purpose of
the warrant requirement, which is to prevent erroneous intrusions, would be
defeated. Judicial acquiescence in overzealous, careless, or unreasonable po-
lice conduct because the conduct led to the discovery of criminality would in-
crease the risk of intrusion on innocent people.
To illustrate, imagine two individuals, Curt and Ian, whose homes are on
opposite sides of town. Curt, the "criminal," uses his bedroom as a drug labo-
ratory; Ian, the "innocent," uses his home and bedroom for the usual intimate,
noncriminal activities. In order for the fourth amendment to protect Ian's ex-
pectations of privacy, protection also must extend to Curt in his home and bed-
room. The risk that some criminality will go undetected is the necessary price
for a society which values individual privacy. This is not to say that Curt has a
right to engage in illegal activity in his home. He clearly does not. Rather,
both Curt and Ian have a right to be free of unreasonable intrusions into their
homes. If the police investigate Curt, put their findings in an affidavit, and
take it before a magistrate who determines that there is probable cause to be-
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diminish individual freedom and privacy to a level inconsistent
with common notions of the nature of American society. Once
again, this analysis does not mean that the police never can
peek into a bedroom window, only that the peeking must be
"reasonable." If the police have probable cause to believe that
an individual's bedroom contains a drug lab and they convince a
neutral and detached magistrate of that fact, the police can ob-
tain a warrant and search the bedroom thoroughly. If the po-
lice hear gunshots emanating from a home, they can enter that
home and bedroom even in the absence of a warrant, because
the intrusion in such an emergency situation is "reasonable"
even without a warrant.65
This Article adopts Professor LaFave's interpretation of
Justice Harlan's test and applies it in Part II to determine
whether the fourth amendment should cover the governmental
investigatory techniques at issue. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court rarely uses Professor LaFave's suggested approach for
defining the interests that the fourth amendment protects.
While expressly embracing Justice Harlan's two-part analysis,
the Court has made little effort to refine that test; instead, the
Court has focused primarily on the "knowingly exposes to the
public" language that the Katz majority used.66 Regrettably,
lieve that evidence of criminality will be discovered in Curt's home, the magis-
trate may issue a warrant for police to search Curt's home, and the police can
use any evidence they find to prosecute him.
Any distinction based on the use to which people put their bedrooms will
result in less privacy protection for everyone. If the police may enter Curt's
home without complying with the fourth amendment and successfully argue
that their fortuitous discovery of criminality renders Curt's privacy interest
unprotectable, then arbitrary police decisions will supplant an otherwise uni-
form standard to which police must adhere for all home intrusions. Police
would receive the message: "You might as well search Ian's house, too. If he
is a criminal, he cannot argue that his rights have been violated." That Ian can
institute a civil suit is no answer. The problems with civil remedies for police
illegalities have been well documented. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53
(1961). Moreover, the purpose of the fourth amendment is to prevent errone-
ous intrusions into privacy, not merely to redress them. See i&i at 650-53.
Thus, any withholding of fourth amendment protection based on criminal use
of otherwise private areas can lead only to lower standards for police conduct
and a concomitant society-wide reduction in privacy and security from govern-
mental intrusion.
In sum, when deciding whether to extend fourth amendment protection to
particular items, statements, or activities, the Court must consider the nature
of the individual interest in abstract terms, ignoring the criminal use to which
an otherwise private area is put.
65. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987).




the Court has severed that language from its context and used
it as a talisman, ruling that any objects, statements, or activities
exposed to the public-even if exposed only to a very limited
degree-do not deserve fourth amendment protection. 67 This
analysis, although perhaps commendable for its simplicity, begs
the constitutional question and undercuts the spirit of both
Katz and the fourth amendment. There is no better illustration
of the effect that this analysis has had on the breadth of fourth
amendment protection than the last decade of post-Katz
jurisprudence.
II. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE KATZ TEST
A. BIG BROTHER: "WHO WAS THAT ON THE PHONE?"
In the decade following the 1967 Katz decision, several
Supreme Court opinions limited the scope of the fourth amend-
ment.68 The most significant damage to fourth amendment
protection, however, occurred in a line of cases beginning in
1979 with Smith v. Maryland.69 Smith involved police use of a
"pen register" surveillance device. 70 A pen register records the
numbers dialed from a particular telephone and is used by the
telephone company for billing purposes.71 The police in Smith
wanted a list of the telephone numbers dialed by Smith, whom
67. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1988) (find-
ing no protection for curbside garbage); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-
14 (1986) (finding no protection from aerial surveillance of curtilage); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (finding no protection from gov-
ernmental use of tracking device to monitor travels).
68. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (holding that bank
depositors have no protectable fourth amendment interest in bank records);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1971) (holding that government's
use of agents wired with recording devices to monitor conversations between
defendant and agent does not give rise to fourth amendment protection). That
the Court already was setting a course inconsistent with Justice Harlan's two-
part test is apparent from Justice Harlan's lengthy dissent in White. See 401
U.S. at 768 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
70. Id at 737.
71. Id. at 736 n.1. As the Court explained:
A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed
on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the
dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communi-
cations and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed....
A pen register is "usually installed at a central telephone facility
[and] records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line" to




they suspected of both participating in a robbery and subse-
quently making a number of threatening, obscene telephone
calls to the robbery victim. Without first obtaining a warrant,
the police requested the telephone company to employ a pen
register to record the numbers dialed from Smith's home tele-
phone.7 2 Information from the pen register revealed that
Smith called the robbery victim on the first day of the "surveil-
lance." Based on this information, the police obtained a war-
rant to search Smith's home, where they found further
incriminating evidence.73
The Supreme Court held that the government's use of the
pen register did not constitute a "search" implicating the fourth
amendment.7 4 The Court specifically approved the two-part
test that Justice Harlan had propounded in his Katz concur-
rence,75 but, in applying that test to the use of pen registers, the
Court misinterpreted the "knowingly exposes to the public"
language that the Katz majority used. According to the Court
in Smith, people realize from their monthly telephone bills that
the telephone company has the equipment for making records
of the numbers they dial.76 Consequently, when people use
their telephones they voluntarily expose to the telephone com-
pany the numbers dialed and thereby assume the risk that the
telephone company will reveal that information to the police.77
Based on this analysis, the Court held that a person has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his
telephone.78
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith, which has sur-
vived unscathed through the Court's recent decision in Califor-
nia v. Greenwood,79 significantly narrowed the scope of fourth
72. Id. at 737.
73. Id
74. Id at 745-46.
75. I& at 740.
76. Id. at 742-43 (noting also that most telephone books indicate that tele-
phone company has system that "can frequently help in identifying to the au-
thorities the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls").
77. Id at 744.
78. Id. at 745.
79. 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1629 (1988). In explaining its earlier ruling in Smith,
the Court stated:
An individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers
dialed on his telephone, we reasoned, because he voluntarily conveys
those numbers to the telephone company when he uses the telephone.
Again, we observed that "a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."
Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44).
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amendment protection. The theory that emerged in Smith pro-
vides that if a person exposes any activity, statement, or ob-
ject-however intimate-to any other member of the public, in
any degree, the person assumes the risk that the third party
will reveal to the government anything so exposed. No fourth
amendment protection therefore exists against police efforts
specifically designed to detect such intimate, albeit "exposed"
information, even when the police take a much closer look than
the limited "public exposure" allows.
The theory in Smith rests on a fallacy. While individuals
reasonably may expect that the telephone company will pre-
serve and use for billing purposes the numerical information
conveyed when a number is dialed, they also expect that the
government will not use such information to compile a list of
whom they call, when, how often, and for how long. Such gov-
ernmental snooping smacks of Orwell's Big Brother, protection
from which is the essence of the fourth amendment. Moreover,
when the government uses the numbers recorded on a pen reg-
ister not just as numerical information but as a means of dis-
covering intimate details about a person's life, such as the
identities of acquaintances and the frequency with which the
person contacts those acquaintances, the government has in-
truded far beyond the limited degree to which the person vol-
untarily has exposed such details to public view. Knowingly
exposing numerical information to the telephone company for
billing purposes is not coextensive with exposing highly private
information of the kind the government may hope to discover
through the use of the otherwise unobjectionable pen register.
The appropriate inquiry, which the Court in Smith should
have employed in determining whether the government's use
of pen registers implicates the fourth amendment, is whether
the unregulated governmental use of pen registers would di-
minish individual freedoms and privacy to an intolerable
level.8 0 Should the police or other branches of government be
free, with no constitutional restraint, to employ pen registers to
make records of whom individuals call, how often, and for what
length of time? Or should the judicial branch construe the
fourth amendment to require that such governmental surveil-
lance be reasonable? A duty to act reasonably is a minimal
burden on legitimate law enforcement activity.
"Reasonableness" does not necessarily require that police
surveillance be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant based
80. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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on probable cause.81 It may mean only that government offi-
cials should be limited as to either the length of time they may
direct such surveillance at an individual or the uses to which
they may put the discovered information. It may simply re-
quire police to swear out an affidavit that the subject of the sur-
veillance is a suspect in criminal activity.8 2 Nevertheless, the
Smith Court bypassed these alternatives. Consequently, after
Smith v. Maryland, there is no fourth amendment protection
for individuals' subjective expectations of privacy regarding
whom they call, the frequency of those calls, or their length.
B. BIG BROTHER: "WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN ALL DAY?"
In United States v. Knotts,8 3 without first obtaining a war-
rant, Minnesota narcotics officers placed a "beeper"-a radio
transmitter used as a tracking device-in a large drum of chlo-
roform, a chemical commonly used in the illegal manufacture
of drugs.8 4 One of Knotts' co-defendants purchased the drum
81. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. The fourth amend-
ment's reasonableness requirement is flexible enough to permit varying de-
grees of protection depending on the significance of a privacy interest. For
example, the privacy interest in the contents of telephone conversations may
be greater than the interest in the associated information obtained by the use
of pen registers. Accordingly, the government's gathering of this "noncon-
tent" information may deserve less regulation than the highly intrusive sur-
veillance in Katz. It is unresponsive to argue that the amount of fourth
amendment protection should not depend on a value judgment, because a
value judgment is exactly what the Court presently exercises in deciding the
more significant question of whether fourth amendment protection applies at
all. It makes much more sense, and is far less drastic, for the Court to make
this value judgment when determining the amount of fourth amendment pro-
tection that is available, rather than when determining in the first instance
whether the fourth amendment provides any protection.
82. Following the Smith decision, Congress passed a statute limiting gov-
ernmental use of pen registers. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3126 (Supp. IV 1986). Under
the statute, a law enforcement agency wishing to use a pen register must apply
for a court order authorizing the use of the register for a period not to exceed
sixty days. Id § 3123(c). The law enforcement officer must certify that infor-
mation likely to be obtained by the installation and use of the pen register is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. Id. § 3123(a).
It is ironic that the legislative branch would enact fourth amendment-like
protection for the use of pen registers after the Supreme Court had deter-
mined-in accordance with Justice Harlan's test-that society does not recog-
nize as reasonable any privacy expectations in the numbers dialed from a
telephone. The legislative branch is, after all, the ultimate voice of the people.
Congressional enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3123 is evidence that either the
Supreme Court is incorrectly applying Justice Harlan's test or that the Court's
notions of societal beliefs are erroneous.
83. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
84. Id. at 277-78.
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of chloroform, placed it in his car, and drove away. The narcot-
ics agents, with the aid of the beeper and a police helicopter,
followed the automobile's journey from the place of purchase
to a secluded cabin.8 5 Based on this observation and informa-
tion gathered from further surveillance of the cabin, the agents
obtained a search warrant and discovered a fully operational
drug laboratory in the cabin.8 6 Knotts moved to suppress evi-
dence of the drug laboratory, arguing that the warrantless use
of the beeper was an illegal search. The trial court denied his
motion and he was convicted.8 7
The Supreme Court decided that the officers' warrantless
use of the beeper was legal, ruling that the government's use of
a tracking device does not implicate fourth amendment protec-
tions.88 Reaffirming Justice Harlan's two-part test as determi-
native, the Court held that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his travels on public thoroughfares,
explaining that travelers voluntarily convey, to anyone who
wants to look, their direction, their stops, and their final
destination. 9
In other words, the Court held that public travel is incon-
sistent with a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although this
holding may be superficially appealing, the appeal results from
85. Id. at 278. A radio receiver located in the police helicopter monitored
and tracked the beeper. The driver apparently detected the police pursuit, be-
cause he took evasive maneuvers and the narcotics officers momentarily lost
visual surveillance. With the aid of the receiver in the helicopter, however,
they located the beeper signal about an hour later. The Court found that the
resolution of the case would not have been different had the entire surveil-
lance been visual and unaided by the beeper. Id at 285.
86. Id. at 279.
87. Id.
88. Id at 285.
89. The Court stated:
The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in
this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on
public streets and highways....
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place
to another. When [Knotts' co-defendant] traveled over the public
streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact
that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction,
the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destina-
tion when he exited from public roads onto private property.
Id. at 281-82.
Even if the Court had decided that tracking an individual's travels impli-
cates fourth amendment rights, it appears that Knotts had no standing to ob-




the Court's misinterpretation of Katz's "knowingly exposes to
the public" language. As in Smith v. Maryland, the Court ap-
parently believed that no matter how minimally an individual
has exposed an activity to public scrutiny, that individual has
completely relinquished fourth amendment protection once the
public exposure occurs.90
There is a significant distinction between exposure to cas-
ual observation and the total relinquishment of privacy expec-
tations. Certainly individuals traveling on public roads know
that other members of the public can observe their travel, if
only for a limited time. It is extremely unlikely, however, that
people along the route have any but a passing interest in partic-
ular drivers, where they are going, or whom they are going to
visit. In addition, it would be absurd to suggest that those who
have observed particular drivers in transit have in any way in-
truded on the travelers' privacy. Nevertheless, in the unlikely
event that everyone in town pooled their collective knowledge
of a particular individual's travels and built a daily record of
every place the individual went, everyone visited, and the
length of each stop, it would be straining common sense to call
this behavior unintrusive. In fact, if people expected such
nosey behavior from others, evasive driving maneuvers might
become the norm. Yet, this is precisely the type and character
of surveillance that Knotts allows the government to undertake
without any fourth amendment restraints.9
In short, when the government engages in continuous sur-
veillance, recording intimate details of individuals' personal
lives-where they go, whom they see, when, how often, for how
90. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
91. Knotts argued that a holding that beeper surveillance of travels does
not implicate the fourth amendment would result in the possibility of twenty-
four hour surveillance of any citizen without judicial knowledge or supervi-
sion. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283. The Court responded: "But the fact is that the
'reality hardly suggests abuse,' .... if such dragnet-type law enforcement prac-
tices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable." Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted).
The Court's response misses the point. Indeed, the Court's response ad-
mits that in certain circumstances fourth amendment protection should be
available. In other words, the individual interest implicated in Knotts is wor-
thy of protection from arbitrary and unreasonably extensive governmental in-
trusions. Yet, the Court's answer that there will be time to adjust its
constitutional principles should the government abuse its tracking power is in-
apposite. The Bill of Rights was based on distrust of governmental power, and
any interpretation of the scope of those rights should permit a constitutional
flexibility sufficient not only to address, but also to discourage, egregious gov-
ernmental intrusions. See supra notes 19, 60.
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long-the government is taking a much closer look than are
those disinterested members of the public to whom the individ-
uals have, in a limited, piecemeal fashion, exposed their travels.
Simply because individuals have, to a limited degree, exposed
an activity to public view, the Court should not conclude that
they have completely relinquished all fourth amendment pro-
tection. To so interpret Katz is to read its language while ignor-
ing its spirit.
Rather, the fundamental inquiry should be whether al-
lowing the unregulated governmental tracking of a person's
travels would diminish individual privacy to an intolerable
level.92 Should the government, limited only by self-restraint,
be able to follow an individual for an unlimited amount of time,
recording the routes, places stopped, and people visited? Or, is
such governmental surveillance sufficiently intrusive that the
Court should impose a requirement of reasonableness? Requir-
ing "reasonable" surveillance would not significantly hinder le-
gitimate law enforcement efforts. For example, probable cause
existed in Knotts prior to the tracking. 93 A quick visit to a mag-
istrate for a warrant based on that probable cause would have
sufficiently protected any privacy interest of those involved.
Moreover, a "search" of public travels may be reasonable on
less than probable cause;94 or it may be reasonable without a
showing of any suspicion as long as it is limited in time.95 In
this way, by broadly interpreting the scope of the fourth
amendment while varying the amount of protection that is rea-
sonable for a particular privacy interest, the Court can achieve
its apparent goal of promoting law enforcement without forfeit-
ing the ability to employ the fourth amendment to regulate
egregious governmental intrusions into citizens' personal lives.
C. BIG BROTHER: "WHAT WERE YOU DOING IN YOUR
BACKYARD?"
Perhaps the ultimate misapplication of Katz's "knowingly
92. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
93. Prior investigation of Knotts and his two cohorts, Armstrong and Pet-
schen, strongly supported the narcotics officers' suspicions. A chemical com-
pany notified a narcotics officer that Armstrong, a former employee, had been
stealing chemicals which could be used to manufacture illicit drugs. Investiga-
tion of Armstrong revealed that he also had been purchasing such chemicals
from another company. In addition, the officers observed that Armstrong al-
ways delivered the chemicals to Petschen. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
94. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 82 (discussing federal legislation that imposed time
limitations on government's investigative use of pen registers).
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exposes to the public" exception to fourth amendment protec-
tion occurred in California v. Ciraolo,9 6 a 1986 case involving
police air surveillance of a fenced backyard. To fully under-
stand the ramifications of Ciraolo, however, one first must ex-
amine Oliver v. United States,97 a 1984 opinion distinguishing,
for fourth amendment purposes, backyards from "open
fields."9 8
In Oliver, narcotics agents received a tip that marijuana
was being grown on Oliver's farm. Without a warrant and, con-
cededly, without probable cause, the agents drove past Oliver's
house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign.9 9 The
agents walked around the gate, searched Oliver's private prop-
erty, and eventually found a field of marijuana about one mile
from the homestead.10 0 The trial court suppressed the evidence
of the discovery of the marijuana field, but the Sixth Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed. 0 1 The Supreme Court ruled that the
evidence was admissible, holding that an individual has no le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in open fields.10 2
To reach its result that there is no legitimate privacy inter-
est in admittedly private property marked with "No Trespass-
ing" signs, the Oliver Court reverted, in part, to a pre-Katz
96. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
97. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
98. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
99. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173 & n.1.
100. Id. at 173.
101. See id. at 173-74. The trial court found that, by posting "No Trespass-
ing" signs, Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain pri-
vate. Id at 173. That analysis misses the point. A low probability of discovery
does not determine whether a privacy interest deserves fourth amendment
protection. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. Rather, the availa-
bility of fourth amendment protection depends on whether the privacy inter-
est involved is sufficiently significant, and the government surveillance
sufficiently intrusive, that withholding fourth amendment protection would
reduce individual privacy and freedom to a level intolerable to society. See
supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
The Sixth Circuit ignored the intrusiveness of the government's conduct,
however, finding that an individual's privacy interest in open fields is insuffi-
cient to warrant fourth amendment protection. United States v. Oliver, 686
F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
102. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. An "open field" does not have to be either
"open" or a "field." Id. at 180 n.l1. Essentially, any privately-owned property
outside the home and curtilage (backyard) is an open field for fourth amend-
ment purposes. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. Thus, a heavily
forested area can be an open field. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11. Even a build-
ing can be considered an open field. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
303 (1987) (suggesting that fourth amendment may not protect barns that are
sufficiently distant from home).
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literal approach. According to the Court, the fourth amend-
ment protects people in their "persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects" but makes no mention of open fields 03 That the Court
rejected such reasoning in Katz is beyond dispute.10 4 The
fourth amendment does not expressly mention telephone con-
versations, yet the Court in Katz specifically extended its pro-
tections to such private activity.1 0
5
103. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77 ("We conclude.., that the government's in-
trusion upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches' pro-
scribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.").
104. See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text (noting transition from
literal reading of fourth amendment's language in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928), to privacy analysis presented in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967)).
105. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. Justice Marshall's eloquent dissent in Oliver
elaborated on the fundamental flaws in the majority's reasoning:
This line of argument has several flaws. Most obviously, it is inconsis-
tent with the results of many of our previous decisions, none of which
the Court purports to overrule. For example, neither a public tele-
phone booth nor a conversation conducted therein can fairly be de-
scribed as a person, house, paper, or effect; yet we have held that the
fourth amendment forbids the police without a warrant to eavesdrop
on such a conversation.
Indeed, the Court's reading of the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment is incapable of explaining even its own holding in this
case. The Court rules that the curtilage, a zone of real property sur-
rounding a dwelling, is entitled to constitutional protection. We are
not told, however, whether the curtilage is a "house" or an "effect"-
or why, if the curtilage can be incorporated into the list of things and
spaces shielded by the Amendment, a field cannot.
The Court's inability to reconcile its parsimonious reading of the
phrase "persons, houses, papers, and effects" with our prior decisions
or even its own holding is a symptom of a more fundamental infirmity
in the Court's reasoning. The Fourth Amendment, like the other cen-
tral provisions of the Bill of Rights that loom large in our modern ju-
risprudence, was designed, not to prescribe with "precision"
permissible and impermissible activities, but to identify a fundamen-
tal human liberty that should be shielded forever from government
intrusion. We do not construe constitutional provisions of this sort
the way we do statutes, whose drafters can be expected to indicate
with some comprehensiveness and exactitude the conduct they wish
to forbid or control and to change those prescriptions when they be-
come obsolete. Rather, we strive, when interpreting these seminal
constitutional provisions, to effectuate their purposes-to lend them
meanings that ensure that the liberties the Framers sought to protect
are not undermined by the changing activities of government officials.
The liberty shielded by the Fourth Amendment, as we have often
acknowledged, is freedom "from unreasonable government intrusions
into ... legitimate expectations of privacy." That freedom would be
incompletely protected if only government conduct that impinged
upon a person, house, paper, or effect were subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Accordingly, we have repudiated the proposition that the
Fourth Amendment applies only to a limited set of locales or kinds of
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The Court in Oliver attempted to justify its result under
Katz's privacy analysis by belittling a person's privacy interest
in open fields.1 0 6 Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
stated the unremarkable proposition that fields are not very
much like a home.10 7 From this proposition he concluded that
open fields are undeserving of fourth amendment protection. L 8
The Court's analysis fails to distinguish between degrees of pri-
vacy interests.10 9 Simply because people expect more privacy in
their homes than elsewhere on their property does not mean
that there should be no fourth amendment protection for the
latter.
The Court historically has extended fourth amendment
protection to places clothed with a lesser expectation of privacy
than a home-automobiles, for example.110 A more precise and
less drastic means of addressing the differences in privacy ex-
pectations is simply to interpret the fourth amendment's rea-
sonableness requirement as providing less protection to those
property. In Katz v. United States, we expressly rejected a proffered
locational theory of the coverage of the Amendment, holding that it
"protects people, not places." Since that time we have consistently
adhered to the view that the applicability of the provision depends
solely upon "whether the person invoking its protection can claim a
'justifiable,' 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that
has been invaded by government action." The Court's contention
that, because a field is not a house or effect, it is not covered by the
Fourth Amendment is inconsistent with this line of cases and with
the understanding of the nature of constitutional adjudication from
which it derives.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 185-88 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
106. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
107. Id. Justice Powell wrote:
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protect-
ing the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that
occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usu-
ally are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home...
would not be.
Id.
108. Id. at 181.
109. See Tomkovicz, supra note 13, at 661-77.
110. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
153-54 (1925).
The Court never has ruled that cars are undeserving of fourth amend-
ment protection simply because they are not as "private" as homes. Rather,
recognizing the obvious distinction between homes and cars, the Court has
found that warrantless automobile searches are "reasonable" so long as there
is probable cause to search the car. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-95.
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interests that are less private. 1" The Court has taken this ap-
proach in automobile search cases; searching an automobile re-
quires probable cause, but police can undertake such a search
constitutionally without first obtaining a warrant. 12 In other
words, warrantless searches of automobiles are "reasonable" so
long as the police have probable cause. It is precisely because
people have a lesser expectation of privacy in their cars that
cars receive less fourth amendment protection. 13 Thus, the
recognition that open fields are not as connected with intimate
personal activities as is a home should not mean that those
fields, part of a person's private property, are undeserving of
fourth amendment protection. Nevertheless, after Oliver, po-
lice or other government officials are apparently free, for
fourth amendment purposes, to intrude on much of a person's
land without reason, at any time, and for any length of time.114
111. See Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 376, 390-95.
112. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-95; see also supra note 110 (discussing car
searches). The justification for allowing warrantless automobile searches must
derive, in part, from the Court's lack of concern about erroneous searches of
automobiles by overzealous police officers. Because automobiles are viewed as
less intimate than homes, it would not make much sense to require that magis-
trates, rather than police, draw the inferences necessary to a probable cause
determination. Moreover, probable cause to search a car usually develops
along the roadside subsequent to a traffic stop. It would be inconvenient for
both officers and drivers to delay the search until the officers could obtain a
warrant.
113. Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-92. Originally, warrantless auto searches were
upheld as reasonable based on a car's mobility. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
The mobility of an automobile apparently created its own emergency excep-
tion to the warrant requirement-by the time police secure a warrant, the car
may be gone. The mobility of the car is no longer the primary rationale for
differentiating the full fourth amendment protection for homes from the
lesser protection for automobiles. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391; see also Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (upholding warrantless search of car even after
officer had seized car and driven it to police station). The primary modern ra-
tionale underlying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is the
lower expectation of privacy associated with automobiles. Carney, 471 U.S. at
391.
The Court's approach in the automobile cases is consistent with the ap-
proach proposed in this Article for fourth amendment analysis generally. See
supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Recognition of a distinction be-
tween homes and other enclosures should not lead automatically to a decision
that privacy interests less significant than that of the home are completely un-
worthy of fourth amendment protection from arbitrary governmental intru-
sion. The fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement is flexible enough
to accommodate varying degrees of privacy interests.
114. The police may, of course, be subject to prosecution for criminal tres-
pass, but prosecutors are unlikely to bring charges. Cf. Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 137 (1954) (noting that police are unlikely to inform on each other
after committing illegal searches). Moreover, the Supreme Court long has rec-
(Vol. 73:583
FOURTH AMENDMENT
That is what it means when the Court withholds fourth amend-
ment protection-the government is not required to act
reasonably.
An important distinction emerged in Oliver between "open
fields" and "curtilage"-the land immediately surrounding and
associated with the home.1 5 According to the Court, the curti-
lage of a home is sufficiently connected to a home's intimate ac-
tivities to be worthy of fourth amendment protection."16 In
fact, the Court considered the curtilage "part of the home itself
for fourth amendment purposes."11 7 This "home outside the
home" was relatively shortlived, however, for in California v.
Ciraolo, 811 the Supreme Court effectively rendered expecta-
tions of privacy in curtilage meaningless.
In Ciraolo, the police in Santa Clara, California, received
ognized that civil liability for tortious police conduct, such as trespass, is an
ineffective substitute for fourth amendment protection. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961); Irvine, 347 U.S. at 137. But see Wilkins, supra note 13,
at 1092-1100.
115. The Supreme Court defined curtilage as "the area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life.'" Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (citations omitted).
116. I.
117. Id. The quote reflects the Court's arbitrary and rigid line drawing. By
appending the curtilage to the home, the Court extends to the curtilage full
fourth amendment protection. Conversely, open fields, which begin where the
curtilage ends, receive no constitutional protection. The distinction takes on
even greater significance when one considers how blurred the line between
curtilage and open fields really is. In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294
(1987), the Court set out the factors relevant to distinguishing curtilage from
open fields:
[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particu-
lar reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be
curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclo-
sure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area
is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by. We do not suggest that combining
these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechani-
cally applied, yields a "correct" answer to all extent-of-curtilage ques-
tions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the
degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant
consideration-whether the area in question is so intimately tied to
the home itself that it should be placed under the home's "umbrella"
of Fourth Amendment protection.
Id. at 301.
The inherent blurriness of the line magnifies the inaccuracy of the Court's
all-or-nothing approach to fourth amendment regulation of governmental in-
trusions on privately-owned land. Police may not set foot on the curtilage
without meeting the strict requirements for entry into a home, yet a few feet
outside the curtilage they may traipse, trample, and tread to their heart's con-
tent without even implicating the fourth amendment.
118. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in Ciraolo's
backyard, which was enclosed by a ten-foot fence.119 Without
obtaining a warrant-probable cause was surely lacking' 2O-the
police flew over Ciraolo's home and curtilage in an airplane,
identifying and photographing marijuana plants. The police
used this documentation to obtain a warrant, ultimately leading
to the seizure of a large number of marijuana plants.121 Ciraolo
pleaded guilty after the trial judge denied his motion to sup-
press the evidence.122 The Supreme Court held that the trial
judge properly denied the motion to suppress, finding that the
aerial surveillance did not intrude on any interest protected by
the fourth amendment.123 Thus, after Ciraolo, it is not a
"search" for the government to fly over persons' fenced back-
yards and look to see what they are doing. Ironically, although
Oliver ruled that government agents walking through a per-
son's backyard constitutes a "search" implicating fourth amend-
ment protection-on the ground that curtilage is part of the
area encompassing the intimate activities associated with the
home1 24 -- Ciraolo allows police to observe those intimate activi-
ties from above with no restrictions.
The Court's internally inconsistent approach to constitu-
tional protection for curtilage is the product of its superficial
view of the Katz inquiry. The Court in Ciraolo restated the fol-
lowing Katz language: "What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.1' 25 The Court then observed
that any member of the public flying in the relevant airspace
who happened to glance down could have seen the entire back-
119. Id. at 209. A six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence completely
enclosed Ciraolo's yard.
120. Police apparently acted only on the strength of an anonymous tele-
phone tip that marijuana was growing in Ciraolo's yard. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 209. An anonymous tip, without any supporting evidence indicating its accu-
racy, falls short of establishing probable cause, even under the flexible ap-
proach to probable cause adopted by the Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
227 (1983). Gates adopted a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances approach,
suggesting that the two factors most relevant to assessing informants' tips are
the presence of facts that show how the informants know what they purport
to know and facts that establish the veracity or reliability of the informants.
Id. at 238. Neither factor was mentioned in Ciraolo.
121. 476 U.S. at 209-10.
122. Id. at 210.
123. Id, at 214-15.
124. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.




yard.12 6 Thus, the Court concluded, Ciraolo exposed his fenced
backyard to public view and, consequently, relinquished any ex-
pectation of privacy he had for that yard.1
27
The Court's analysis in Ciraolo completely misses the point
of Katz and misreads the spirit of the fourth amendment.
Katz's "public exposure" illustration concerned subjective
rather than societally acceptable, or objective, expectations of
privacy. 128 The Katz language, which the Court now rigidly
uses as a talisman, did little more than recognize that a person
does not have even a subjective expectation of privacy in things
that are knowingly exposed to the public, no matter where that
may occur-home, office, or curtilage. That is, the fourth
amendment generally protects activities within the home or of-
fice because, under Justice Harlan's test, society will recognize
privacy expectations in those places as "reasonable" or "legiti-
mate;" but when individuals knowingly expose otherwise pri-
vate activities to the public, they relinquish constitutional
protection because they have not manifested a subjective expec-
tation of privacy.
Ironically, while the Court in Ciraolo ruled that Ciraolo
knowingly exposed his curtilage to public view, it expressly
found that he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy by
126. IdR at 213-14.
127. Id. at 214.
128. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The complete context of the Supreme
Court's oft repeated phrase is: "What a person knowingly exposes to the pub-
lic, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in any area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omit-
ted).
The first phrase indicates that even in areas where society will recognize
privacy expectations as reasonable, such as the home or office, a person can
relinquish fourth amendment protection by not manifesting a subjective ex-
pectation-that is, by knowingly exposing items or activities therein to public
view.
On the other hand, what a person seeks to preserve as private (also clearly
referring to subjective expectations), even in areas accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected. Not "must," but "may." Protection is af-
forded, of course, only where subjective expectations are "reasonable" or wor-
thy of protection.
Even Justice Harlan, who enunciated the allegedly controlling two-part
test, believed that the "knowing exposure" language of the majority referred
only to the subjective aspect of his test. In explaining the majority's "know-
ingly exposes to the public" illustration, Justice Harlan wrote: "Thus a man's
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, ac-
tivities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not
'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited."
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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fencing in his curtilage.129 This internal contradiction is evi-
dence that Katz thoroughly confuses the Court; the Court is in-
correctly employing the "knowingly exposes to the public"
language as the sine qua non of Justice Harlan's objective test.
The Justices in Katz, however, never intimated that the mere
possibility that someone might view an activity, hear a state-
ment, or catch a glimpse of a possession, would render an indi-
vidual's subjective expectation of privacy illegitimate or
unreasonable. Such a view would turn the inquiry from one of
"reasonable expectations of privacy" to "certainty of absolute
solitude.' 130 To so restrict fourth amendment protection is
more reminiscent of Big Brother than of a nation founded on
individual liberties.
The Court's confusion is apparent from the illustration it
used to support its Ciraolo decision. According to the Court,
"The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never
been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield
their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares."'' 1
The Court does not explain why this statement is true. It is
true because there is no subjective expectation of privacy in any
activity performed in full view of a public road; and, even if
such a subjective expectation existed, society would not regard
it as reasonable. This example is exactly the type of situation
to which the Katz Court was referring when it stated that the
fourth amendment does not protect things knowingly exposed
to public view. Requiring police to look away would be ridicu-
lous indeed. Consequently, courts consistently have held that it
is not a search implicating fourth amendment restrictions for
an officer merely to look at what is exposed to "plain view."' 32
Individuals simply have manifested no subjective expectations
of privacy in items and activities that police can view so unob-
trusively. Thus, when police drive from home to home looking
in people's yards, even though they may be "searching" in a dic-
tionary sense, such activity is not a search for fourth amend-
ment purposes.
A much different situation arises, however, when individu-
als have taken steps to preserve their curtilage from the intru-
129. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
130. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that fourth amendment protects privacy, not solitude).
131. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
132. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that it is
not a "search" for officer issuing speeding ticket to observe those things in
driver's car left in "plain view").
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sion of the public's eye, as Ciraolo did. Such individuals have
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. They have not,
as the Court believed in Ciraolo, exposed their backyard activi-
ties to plain public view.133 Police will not need to shield their
eyes while driving past; they will be completely unable to ob-
serve those intimate backyard activities that were recognized in
Oliver, because the activities are not in plain view.
Of course, finding that a defendant manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in curtilage does not end the inquiry. A
court also must determine whether that subjective expectation
is one which society would deem deserving of fourth amend-
ment protection from arbitrary intrusions by the uninvited gov-
ernmental eye. 3 4 This determination has nothing to do with
hypothesizing a scenario involving some limited chance of pas-
sive public intrusion, physical or visual. Rather, the analysis in-
volves assessing the nature of the individual interest and the
degree of governmental intrusion, inquiring whether the unreg-
ulated and arbitrary use of this surveillance technique would
diminish individual privacy and freedoms to an intolerable de-
gree. 35 The privacy interest associated with the curtilage of a
home is as important in Ciraolo as it was in Oliver, in fact, the
interest is identical. 36 The only distinction between Oliver and
Ciraolo is the surveillance technique that the police used-ac-
tual, physical trespass in Oliver and visual intrusion in Ciraolo.
It is difficult to see how the physical intrusion is more antithet-
ical to the intimate activities associated with the home and the
curtilage than is visual surveillance. In Nineteen Eighty-Four,
the telescreen in Winston Smith's living room destroyed his pri-
133. Some situations do exist in which an individual has displayed no sub-
jective expectation of privacy even with respect to fenced curtilage. For exam-
ple, if a home is next to a tall building where many people have an
unobstructed view of the backyard, the owner has no subjective expectation of
privacy that society will regard as worthy of fourth amendment protection. In
such a situation, it should not matter whether police look at the backyard
from the roof of the building or from an airplane. The police surveillance is
not intrusive because of the degree to which the backyard already is exposed
to the public. The actual facts in Ciraolo, however, bear no resemblance to the
preceding illustration.
134. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text. It would seem that the
Court already made this decision in Oliver when it equated the curtilage with
the home. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text; Ashdown, supra note
13, at 1298-1310, 1311-29; Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1107-28.




vacy as surely as if Big Brother himself had lived there.137
Any distinction between actual and constructive govern-
mental presence for fourth amendment purposes is wholly arti-
ficial. 138 For example, consider individuals who use their
backyards for swimming and sunbathing in the nude. To en-
sure privacy, they can either buy land and build a home in a
remote rural area or they can encircle their curtilage with a
fence higher than eye level.139 So long as they do not live adja-
cent to a high-rise apartment building, or a park filled with
trees that children commonly are known to climb, they have in
no sense knowingly exposed their curtilage to public view, as
the Court used that phrase in Katz. Rather, they have mani-
fested, as the Ciraolo Court recognized, a subjective expectation
of privacy.
Such an expectation is also "legitimate" for fourth amend-
ment purposes. Given the objectively important nature of a pri-
vacy interest in curtilage activities, focused governmental aerial
surveillance of that area is so intrusive that it should be subject
to the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement. Just
as the Supreme Court has extended fourth amendment protec-
tion against unreasonable physical intrusions on an individual's
curtilage,140 the Court should interpret the scope of the fourth
amendment to extend protection when the intrusion is visual.
It is difficult to imagine that nude sunbathers would be signifi-
cantly less embarrassed by police gliding overhead, taking pic-
137. See G. ORWELL, supra note 1, at 6-7. Orwell described the telescreen
as follows:
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound
that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be
picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of
vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well
as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were
being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system,
the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork.
It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time.
But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted
to. You had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the
assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in
darkness, every movement scrutinized.
Id.
138. See Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 365, 386-93 (discussing equality of
governmental presence).
139. The Supreme Court did not intimate in Oliver that an individual's cur-
tilage was less worthy of protection in the city than in rural areas. See Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Of course, living in crowded areas may
require that an individual take more extensive steps to manifest a subjective
expectation of privacy in his curtilage-for example, by building a fence.
140. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
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tures, than by police officers climbing the fence and looking
over, or, without invitation, walking through the swimming and
bathing area.
Moreover, even if physical intrusion somehow could be dis-
tinguished from visual surveillance, the complete denial of
fourth amendment protection for the latter does not follow log-
ically from the slight degree of difference between two very in-
trusive types of governmental surveillance. If varying degrees
of highly intrusive surveillance do exist, the drawing of an arbi-
trary line between protected activities and unprotected activi-
ties is not the most accurate fourth amendment means for
recognizing distinctions in various types of surveillance. The
"reasonable search" command of the fourth amendment is suf-
ficiently flexible to permit recognition of varying degrees of
governmental intrusion.141 Just as a reasonable search of a
home requires greater protections than does a reasonable
search of a car,142 the amount of protection required to make a
curtilage search reasonable may vary according to whether the
governmental intrusion is visual or physical.
The Supreme Court, however, chose to draw an arbitrary
line based on its theory that people in commercial aircraft can
see into curtilage. Even if such "exposure" were the sine qua
non of the objective part of Justice Harlan's test, as the Court
mistakenly believes, 143 it borders on the absurd to suggest that
this limited risk of public sighting renders subjective expecta-
tions illegitimate and completely unprotectable. Even if nude
sunbathers realized that commercial planes might fly overhead,
it is unlikely that they would build roofs over their backyards.
Uninterested people in planes, who have no information re-
garding which individual owns any of the hundreds of back-
yards visible from the air, do not constitute a significant threat
to privacy. A quick glimpse of sunbathers from a high altitude
reveals none of the intimacies that homeowners seek to pre-
serve by fencing their curtilage. When government agents,
however, have identified a backyard as belonging to a particular
individual, and consciously glide, fly, or hover over that curti-
141. See supra notes 81-82, 94-95, 107-13 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
143. When the Court concedes that a subjective expectation of privacy may
exist but denies fourth amendment protection based on the individual's expo-
sure of an area or activity to the public, the Court superficially employs its
overly literal version of the "knowingly exposes to the public" language of
Katz as the sine qua non of whether expectations of privacy are "reason-
able"-that is, deserving of constitutional protection.
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lage to monitor activities occurring there, those agents have in-
truded on privacy expectations to a far greater degree than
those few uncaring members of the public to whom sunbathers
have "knowingly" exposed a quick glimpse of an unidentifiable
person.
In sum, the Ciraolo holding means that police can peer
down into a person's fenced backyard free of any constitutional
restraints. There is no requirement that government agents act
reasonably so long as they remain in publicly navigable air-
space.14 4 Police arbitrarily can direct air surveillance at any-
one, whether suspected of a crime or not, for interminable
lengths of time without running afoul of constitutional
requirements.
D. BIG BROTHER: "WHAT ARE You DOING
IN YOUR HOME?"
With the decisions in Oliver and Ciraolo, unregulated gov-
ernmental surveillance had crossed individuals' property lines,
hopped their backyard fences, and stood knocking at their back
doors. The Supreme Court answered the door and invited the
government inside with its recent decision in California v.
Greenwood,145 holding that the fourth amendment does not
regulate an official governmental surveillance technique
designed solely to reveal those personal activities conducted
within the home. The surveillance technique involved in
Greenwood was, of course, systematic searching through the
contents of an individual's garbage. 14 6 The fact that the
searched materials were "throw-aways," however, should not
cloud the central fourth amendment inquiry, which focuses on
privacy and not on property.147
144. A fair reading of the opinion in Ciraolo indicates that there are at
least some limits to the Court's theory. Apparently, if government officials
were to descend below publicly navigable airspace, allowing them to view what
those at higher altitudes could not see, the Court would recognize this as a
search for fourth amendment purposes. Even under the Court's mistaken
view of when knowing exposure to the public defeats fourth amendment pro-
tection, such low flying would constitute a search.
145. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
146. Id. at 1627.
147. The Supreme Court in Katz rejected the idea that property interests
are coextensive with the fourth amendment. See supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text. According to the Court, a governmental trespass onto property is
not a prerequisite for fourth amendment applicability. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
Moreover, even when government officials do trespass on private property, the
Court has ruled that such an intrusion does not ipso facto constitute a search.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984). In sum, a trespass to property
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In Greenwood, criminal informants and complaining neigh-
bors led police to suspect Billy Greenwood of drug violations.1 48
One investigator asked the neighborhood's trash collector to
pick up and turn in Greenwood's garbage, which Greenwood
left in opaque, sealed bags on the curb outside his home.1 49
Every week for two months the police searched Greenwood's
trash in this manner.18 0 On several occasions, the garbage con-
tained evidence of narcotics use.151  The police obtained a
search warrant for Greenwood's home, based in part on the
items found in Greenwood's garbage, and discovered evidence
of narcotics trafficking.1 5 2 The Supreme Court held that the
government's warrantless search of Greenwood's garbage was
constitutional on the ground that the fourth amendment offers
no protection to garbage deposited for collection on the curb of
a public street.:5 3
Superficially, the Court's ruling that garbage is undeserv-
ing of fourth amendment protection is appealing. Garbage, af-
ter all, consists of items that the owner has chosen to discard.
Since Katz, however, the Court has refused to equate property
interests with privacy interests.1 54 Although people using a
public telephone booth clearly do not have a formal property
interest in the telephone booth, the Court in Katz recognized
that the telephone booth is temporarily a private place where
conversations deserve constitutional protection.155 Moreover,
when the Supreme Court in Oliver decided not to extend any
fourth amendment protection to open fields, it could reach this
result only by refusing to equate property interests with pri-
is neither necessary nor sufficient to constitute a search; therefore, for fourth
amendment purposes, property and privacy interests are not coextensive.
148. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627. An informant told narcotics agents that
a trunk filled with illegal drugs was en route to Greenwood's residence. In ad-
dition, Greenwood's neighbor complained to police of heavy vehicular traffic
late at night in front of his home. The neighbor stated that the vehicles stayed




152. Id. Even after he was arrested, Greenwood apparently continued to
traffic in narcotics after posting bail. The police, receiving more reports of late
night visitors, continued to search his trash and found additional evidence that
led to a second warrant to search his home, a second discovery of evidence in
the home, and a second arrest. Id. at 1627-28.
153. Id. at 1629.
154. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183; Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53; supra note 147; see
also Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1086-91 (discussing Court's abandonment of
property-based analysis of privacy interests).
155. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
vacy interests. 15 6 Although an individual may have a legal
property interest in open fields, the Court found no privacy in-
terest in lands outside the curtilage sufficient to warrant fourth
amendment constraints.157 In other words, in light of Katz and
Oliver, a property interest is neither necessary nor sufficient to
obtain fourth amendment protection. Thus, although many
lower courts had been ruling that the fourth amendment does
not regulate searches of garbage on the ground that the owner
has abandoned that property, the Supreme Court in Greenwood
appropriately rejected this analysis.1 58 The proper test, accord-
ing to the Court, is Justice Harlan's two-part expectation of pri-
vacy analysis. 59
As in Ciraolo, the Court conceded that individuals may
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage,
which Greenwood did by placing his garbage in opaque, sealed
plastic bags. 60 The focal inquiry, according to the Court, is
whether society is willing to accept such an expectation as ob-
jectively reasonable.1 61 Given the Court's holding that Ciraolo's
expectation of privacy in his fenced backyard was objectively
unreasonable because people might view him from the air, it
follows that Greenwood's expectations are also unreasonable
because a scavenger might go through his trash, or the trash
collector might turn it over to the police. This is, in fact, pre-
cisely the rationale for the Court's ruling in Greenwood.1 62 Ac-
cording to the Court:
[R]espondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to de-
feat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection. It is common
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public
156. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179-80. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying
text.
157. Id. at 180-81.
158. The abandoned property argument was made to the Court in Green-
wood, but the majority did not endorse it. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-
31. The dissent seized the opportunity to declare the Court's rejection of the
theory. See id. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the Greenwood dissenters pointed to an earlier dissent written
by Justice White, the author of the Greenwood majority opinion. In California
v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852 (1987), Justice White clearly expressed his opinion
that a property interest in trash does not resolve the fourth amendment issue.
See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Rooney,
107 S. Ct. at 2858 (White, J., dissenting)).
159. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1628-29. Of course, to the extent that the Court relies on




street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops,
and other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their
refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third
party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through re-
spondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Ac-
cordingly.... respondents could have had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded. 163
The Court then overapplied and misconstrued its talisman
from Katz: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."'1 64 Once again, this phrase, intended
as a simple illustration of when individuals can claim no subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, has been perverted by the Court to
render subjective expectations "illegitimate" or "unreasonable"
whenever the Court can conceive of a scenario under which a
member of the public might observe that which the targeted in-
dividual seeks to keep private.165 Playing such a speculative
game begs the constitutional question of whether society deems
a manifested subjective privacy expectation to be worthy of
fourth amendment protection from unreasonable governmental
intrusion. Indeed, the Court's analysis has no stopping point. If
the mere possibility of public observance or intrusion renders
subjective privacy expectations illegitimate, the fourth amend-
ment will not protect even the home, unless its occupants take
steps to ensure that no other member of the public ever enters.
Taking the risk that a home might be burglarized, or taking the
risk that invited guests might catch a glimpse of intimate de-
tails of home life, is no less "knowing exposure to public view"
than the risks taken by the backyard gardener in CiraoZo and
the tidy housekeeper in Greenwood.
166
Moreover, the Court's speculative analysis proves too
much. Even in Katz, a risk existed that the recipient of the
personal phone call might reveal the call's contents to other
members of the public or to the police. 16 7 Yet, taking that risk
did not render unreasonable those subjective expectations of
privacy which Katz manifested by stepping into the phone
booth and pulling the door closed. 168 In essence, the Court has
163. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (footnotes and citations omitted).
164. Id. at 1629 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
165. Justice Brennan vigorously dissented from this Supreme Court guess-
ing game. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (employing
burglary illustration to criticize majority's "might've, could've" analysis).
167. Id. (recognizing that telephone calls might be overheard and that Katz
nevertheless extends fourth amendment protection).
168. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Of course, if the person on the receiving end of
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focused narrowly on one sentence in Katz, interpreted it incon-
sistently with its plain original meaning, and created a test that
not only ignores the spirit of the fourth amendment but, if ap-
plied to Katz, would effectively overrule it. 169 The world
portended by a continued reading of fourth amendment protec-
tions as interpreted in Ciraolo and Greenwood is a world where
individuals must choose either to maintain complete solitude or
to extend an open invitation to intrusive Orwellian governmen-
tal surveillance.' 70 There is no middle ground.
Rather than speculating about whether a member of the
public might observe an object, activity, or statement, the Court
should deny fourth amendment protection only when the un-
regulated governmental surveillance of a particular location or
activity is consistent with the objective privacy interests of a
free society.171 Returning to Greenwood, the question simply
becomes whether personal items that have been thrown away
are private enough to warrant some fourth amendment protec-
tion from unreasonable governmental intrusions. Certainly
when one looks beyond the superficial label of garbage-a label
connoting the relinquishment of a possessory rather than a pri-
vacy interest-it is apparent that garbage bags contain exten-
sive details about the private life led inside the home. By
examining garbage, government officials can accumulate infor-
mation regarding an individual's reading interests, food and
beverage consumption, personal expenses and purchases, sex
the conversation decided to tape the call and to turn the contents over to the
police, such nongovernmental activity would not implicate the fourth amend-
ment. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); infra notes 197-211
and accompanying text. In fact, in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971),
the Court held that police intentionally can place an agent in a position to tape
a conversation with a suspect without implicating that suspect's rights, on the
ground that the suspect takes the risk that persons to whom he makes incrimi-
nating statements will report them to the police. Id at 752. In other words,
the individual has no reasonable expectation that the contents of the conversa-
tion will remain private. The Court's analysis is easily criticized. See infra
note 194.
The Court in Greenwood goes one step further than it did in White.
Under the Court's theory in Greenwood, no one would have a protectable pri-
vacy interest in any conversation because the other party to the conversation
might reveal the contents to governmental authorities. See supra note 167 and
accompanying text. Thus, the Court's theory in Greenwood effectively would
overrule Katz itself.
169. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
170. See Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 402.
171. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing analysis that
this Article proposes as most in keeping with spirit of fourth amendment).
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life, and even personal correspondence. 172 None of the Justices
would suggest that the government may open and read our
mail prior to our receiving it; yet Greenwood allows a similar
intrusion to occur, without limitation, once our mail is thrown
away. Apparently, after Greenwood, individuals will have to
keep letters in a shoebox under the bed or buy paper shredders
to render their subjective expectations of privacy "legitimate"
and deserving of fourth amendment protection.
The Court's analysis in Greenwood never refutes the argu-
ment that Greenwood subjectively expected that his trash
would remain private, at least until it was commingled with the
trash of others, thereby losing its identity as his.173 Under
Katz, the only question remaining is whether society regards
this subjective expectation as "reasonable"-that is, worthy of a
modicum of protection from unlimited governmental intrusion.
The chance that others might peek at an individual's bagged,
tied garbage is totally irrelevant to this inquiry. According to
the Court, "police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their
eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been ob-
served by any member of the public. '174 Although this asser-
tion is true, the search in Greenwood did not involve a mere
observance of otherwise personal items left in plain view of the
public. 175 If Greenwood had littered his trash openly about the
sidewalk, the Court's comment would apply. In that situation,
his trash would have been "knowingly exposed to public view"
as the Court used that phrase in Katz and, consequently, Green-
wood would have manifested no subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. Similarly, if a member of the public actually had ripped
open Greenwood's garbage bag and exposed intimate items to
the plain view of any passerby, the fourth amendment would
not require police officers to avert their eyes. Scavengers are
not government officials; the fourth amendment therefore does
not regulate their intrusion into an individual's privacy.1 76
Moreover, any subsequent police observance of such previously
exposed material is not sufficiently intrusive to require consti-
172. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 1628.
174. Id. at 1629.
175. The fallacy of the Court's reference to police averting their eyes is a
repetition of the Court's fallacious reasoning in Ciraolo. See supra notes 131-
33 and accompanying text.
176. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). The fourth amend-
ment limits only governmental action. See infra notes 197-204 and accompany-




tutional oversight.1-77 None of these situations, however, oc-
curred in Greenwood. The Court's concern about requiring
police to avert their eyes, therefore, is simply inapposite. What
the case actually involved, and what the Court's decision will be
used to support, is affirmative police intrusion into personal de-
tails identifiable from an individual's refuse.
Finally, even to the extent that one accepts the Court's
theory that the placing of garbage bags on the curb for pickup
is a knowing exposure of trash to public view, the government
intrusion permitted in Greenwood far exceeds any conceivable
intrusion by scavengers, children, and animals. For example,
suppose homeless people commonly climb into an apartment
complex dumpster scavenging for recyclable aluminum cans, a
discarded but usable pair of shoes, or scraps of food. It is un-
likely that the residents of the apartment complex would con-
sider that scavenging to be a significant intrusion on their
privacy. The scavenger has no interest in, and no capability for,
associating any one piece of garbage with a particular person.
On the other hand, a systematic governmental intrusion
designed thoroughly to scour discarded items and to detect per-
sonal details of a particular individual's home life is a different
story. The degree of intrusiveness posed by such a governmen-
tal investigation is much greater than that which might be un-
dertaken by those members of the public to whom the
investigated individual has "knowingly exposed" his trash.
Thus, from a societal standpoint, there is a compelling need to
require that purposeful governmental intrusions into such pri-
vacy be reasonable. Intrusive governmental searches of per-
sonal items are what the fourth amendment expressly purports
to regulate.
The reasonableness requirement does not mean that a war-
rant must precede garbage searches. 178 Although this Article
concludes that expectations of privacy in discarded personal
items deserve some fourth amendment protection, such a con-
clusion does not mandate treating garbage searches as the
equivalent of intrusions into the home. The fourth amendment
is sufficiently flexible to allow different levels of protection for
177. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 (1983). For a complete
discussion of Jacobsen and its role in fourth amendment analysis, see infra
notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
178. The Court, even if it chose to recognize a fourth amendment interest
in discarded personal effects, probably would uphold searches of those dis-
carded items as "reasonable" without a warrant.
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different types of privacy interests.1 7 9 Just as a car receives less
protection than a home, so might garbage.'8 0 Reasonable
searches of garbage may require only a time limit preventing
indefinite monitoring of an individual's refuse. Or, perhaps, re-
strictions on the government's use and dissemination of inti-
mate details that are uncovered may make all garbage searches
reasonable. Some fourth amendment protection, however, is
warranted by the uniquely intimate nature of discarded per-
sonal items.
In sum, by defining the scope of the fourth amendment
consistently with the spirit of Katz and adjusting the degree of
available protection according to the relative importance of the
privacy interest at stake, the Court could promote its obvious
goal of aggressive law enforcement without rendering constitu-
tional safeguards impotent to control excessive and egregious
governmental intrusions into individuals' private lives. Instead,
the Court in Greenwood, as it has consistently done in the last
decade, rigidly and unnecessarily drew an absolute line be-
tween full fourth amendment protection and no fourth amend-
ment protection. As a result, a person either must take steps to
ensure absolute privacy or have no privacy at all. Thus, as a re-
sult of Greenwood, the government has the green light to
search anyone's trash, for any reason, at any time, for any
length of time. The only incentive for the government to act
reasonably in searching trash is the government's own sense of
self-restraint. Yet, relying on the government to restrain itself
from unreasonably intruding on privacy is blatantly at odds
with both the express guarantee of the fourth amendment and
the framers' concern about governmental overreaching.' 8 '
III. A NEW MODEL OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION: DEGREES OF EXPOSURE
Setting up a new philosophy for analyzing the scope of
fourth amendment protection is a two-step process. The first
179. See supra notes 30-31, 81-82, 94-95, 110-13 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
181. Justice Harlan, in a post-Katz dissent, left no doubt as to the appropri-
ate approach for deciding whether to extend fourth amendment regulation, in
the first instance, to a particular surveillance technique: "[For those] exten-
sive intrusions that significantly jeopardize [an individual's] sense of security
... more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is required." United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See also supra notes 19, 60 and accompanying text (discussing concern about
too-powerful government that motivated drafters of amendment).
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step involves recognizing and undoing the current misinterpre-
tation of Justice Harlan's two-part test from Katz, 8 2 a test that
the Court repeatedly has identified as the appropriate analyti-
cal framework for determining whether a particular investiga-
tory technique falls within the fourth amendment's scope.
183
The second step requires establishing a standard based on de-
grees of privacy that is both compatible with the spirit of the
fourth amendment and sufficiently flexible to avoid hindering
the Supreme Court's apparent goal of aggressive, effective law
enforcement. With the current composition of the Court, any-
thing less is a fanciful ideal whose time will not soon arrive.
A. RESTORATION OF THE KATZ TEST
The first step toward a more accurate version of fourth
amendment protection is for the Court to recognize that the
"knowingly exposes to the public" language in Katz was merely
an illustration concerning subjective expectations of privacy,
and was not intended as the sine qua non of fourth amendment
protection. 8 4 The Katz language means simply that, at some
point, individuals have exposed their statements, possessions, or
activities to public view to such a degree that courts easily
could infer that these individuals have not manifested a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy.'8 5 As Justice Harlan recognized in
his Katz concurrence, however, when individuals do manifest a
subjective expectation of privacy, they are entitled to fourth
amendment protection, provided only that society would recog-
nize that expectation as reasonable. 8 6
The objective part of Justice Harlan's test-societal recog-
nition of reasonable privacy expectations-is necessarily a value
judgment. 8 7 A reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy
is one that society deems worthy of protection. The two pri-
mary factors influencing that judgment are the nature of the
individual's privacy interest and the degree of intrusiveness of
the governmental surveillance. 8 8 When both of these factors
182. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988); Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
177 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
184. See supra notes 128-35, 161-69 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
186. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
187. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
188. For an extensive explanation of how these factors influence Justice
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coincide to a high degree, such as when the government em-
ploys a highly intrusive surveillance technique that disturbs a
significant privacy interest, society will regard subjectively-held
expectations as legitimate and worthy of protection. Indeed,
some fourth amendment protection must be available in such
an instance if the fourth amendment is to have any meaning at
all. Otherwise, the government could intrude on individual pri-
vacy at will and without constitutional limitation.
The Supreme Court, however, has erased the second-and
focal-prong of Justice Harlan's test by ignoring its two pri-
mary factors. Instead, the Court has mistakenly used the
"knowingly exposes to the public" language as if it were rele-
vant to the objective part of the test and compounded that er-
ror by superficially treating such "exposure" as the
determinate factor in its test. 89 Thus, even after conceding
that the individuals in Ciraolo and Greenwood manifested sub-
jective privacy expectations by fencing their backyards and put-
ting their trash in sealed, opaque containers, the Court used its
Katz talisman to rule such expectations societally illegiti-
mate.190 According to the Court, those privacy expectations
were illegitimate because individuals flying in commercial jets
overhead might see into an unroofed backyard, or scavengers
might open and rummage through garbage bags.' 91 In this way,
the Court undercuts both the letter and spirit of Katz and ig-
nores the two essential factors relevant to determining whether
subjective expectations are worthy of some fourth amendment
protection-the nature of the individual's privacy interest and
the intrusiveness of the governmental surveillance. In Ciraolo,
for example, both of these factors were present to a high de-
gree. The privacy interest in curtilage was high-"part of the
home itself," according to Oliver'92 -and the police overflight
and observation constituted highly intrusive governmental con-
duct. 93 To find obvious subjective expectations of privacy un-
worthy of protection from such a significant intrusion into a
Harlan's objective expectation of privacy inquiry, see supra notes 60-64 and ac-
companying text.
189. Moreover, the Court's absolute, literal interpretation of the talismanic
language undercuts the spirit of the Katz opinion. See supra notes 164-66 and
accompanying text. Thus, if individuals expose activities to the public even in
a limited manner, or merely risk such exposure, they have no fourth amend-
ment protection under the Court's current holdings.
190. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211, 215.
191. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-15.
192. See Oliver v. United States, 406 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
193. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 225 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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home-like area is to ignore the very essence of the fourth
amendment.
That the Court's current interpretation of the fourth
amendment's scope is an untenable one is demonstrated by the
application of the fourth amendment theory expounded in
Ciraolo and Greenwood to the facts of Katz. By conversing with
other people on a telephone, individuals expose their state-
ments to public scrutiny and take the risk that the receiver
might record the call and reveal its contents to others or to the
government. 194 Therefore, under the reasoning in Ciraolo and
Greenwood, the government could freely monitor phone con-
versations without implicating fourth amendment protections.
Katz held that the fourth amendment does protect such conver-
sations, however, providing strong evidence that the Court's re-
cent interpretations of Katz are incorrect. Under the Court's
current theory, Katz itself would have to be overruled.
B. TOWARD A FOURTH AMENDMENT RENAISSANCE: A NEW
MODEL BASED ON DEGREES OF PUBLIC EXPOSURE
Deciding that the Supreme Court repeatedly has miscon-
strued Katz is only half the battle. The "knowingly exposes to
the public" language in Katz is not without meaning. The re-
maining question is how the Court should interpret this lan-
guage in order to create from it a usable guide that is consistent
with the spirit of Justice Harlan's test. First, the Court must
recognize that the language was intended as an illustration of
the' subjective aspect of the privacy inquiry.195 Yet, the Katz
language is not without relevance to the objective part of the
test. When individuals publicly expose otherwise personal as-
pects of their lives in such a manner or to such a degree that
194. In fact, a plurality of the Supreme Court did conclude that there are
no fourth amendment ramifications when police actually persuade one party
to a private conversation to record it or to wear a microphone so that the gov-
ernment can listen in. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
This conclusion is suspect for the same reasons that the Court's decisions
in Knotts, Ciraolo, and Greenwood are suspect-the individual privacy interest
in two-party conversations is high, the governmental intrusiveness is great,
and any limited exposure to the public is not of a sufficient degree to defeat
subjective expectations of privacy, or to render them unworthy of protection.
The Court's decisions in Ciraolo and Greenwood go one step further than
the plurality in White, because White actually spoke to a government agent.
White, 401 U.S. at 746-47. Under the rationale in Greenwood, however, there
would be no protectable privacy interest in any conversation because the party
spoken to might reveal the contents to government authorities. Such a theory
contradicts the Katz holding.
195. See supra notes 128-35, 161-68, 184-94 and accompanying text.
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they do not manifest a subjective expectation of privacy,
neither can those individuals have privacy expectations that so-
ciety would regard as objectively worthy of protection. Any
governmental observation of such an exposed activity is not the
intrusive type of surveillance that the fourth amendment was
designed to regulate. For example, homeowners who grow ma-
rijuana in plain view of passersby, albeit within their curtilage,
have not manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. More-
over, even in the unusual event that the homeowners do expect
privacy, society will not recognize their expectation as reason-
able. Any privacy expectations the homeowners have are not
worthy of fourth amendment protection because the police can
plainly view their curtilage activity in an unintrusive manner.
The homeowners have, in both the letter and spirit of Katz,
knowingly exposed private activities to the public.
In sum, Justice Harlan's subjective and objective tests over-
lap. Where there is no subjective expectation of privacy there
can be no expectation that society would deem objectively wor-
thy of protection.196 Nevertheless, before ruling that exposure
to public view renders expectations unprotectable-on either a
subjective or objective level-the Court should make an inquiry
into the degree of public exposure, not simply the fact of public
exposure, or worse, the mere possibility of public exposure.
1. The Private Party Search Doctrine
The concept of degrees of public exposure has played a sub-
stantial role in similar fourth amendment contexts. An instruc-
tive case is Burdeau v. McDowell,197 decided more than forty
years before Katz. In Burdeau, individuals wrongfully broke
into McDowell's office, safe, and locked desk.19s Finding in-
criminating evidence regarding McDowell, the private individu-
als turned the materials over to an assistant attorney general
who sought to use the evidence to secure McDowell's indict-
196. The converse is not true. The case law is replete with examples of
persons harboring subjective expectations that society does not recognize as
objectively worthy of protection, at least in the Supreme Court's view of soci-
ety's values. See. e.g., Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211-
15.
197. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
198. Id. at 472-74. McDowell's employer discharged him for alleged unlaw-
ful and fraudulent conduct. Agents of the employer took possession of Mc-
Doweli's office, forced open his desk and personal safe, and took his private
papers. Id. The Court assumed that the employer's actions in McDowell's of-
fice were wrongful. See id. at 472-75.
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ment and conviction. 99  McDowell argued that the fourth
amendment prohibited the government's use of property ille-
gally taken by private third parties. The Court rejected his ar-
gument, holding that the fourth amendment offers protection
only against governmental action.200 Because no official of the
federal government had anything to do with the unlawful
seizure in Burdeau, the fourth amendment played no role in
the case.201
This principle became known as the private party search
doctrine. According to the doctrine, the fourth amendment ap-
plies only to searches and seizures conducted by government of-
ficials or people acting on behalf of the government.20 2 Thus,
even if a thief breaks into a home, steals items that implicate
the homeowner in crime, and turns the items over to the police,
the fourth amendment does not apply to the illegal search and
seizure unless the thief was acting at the behest and direction
of government officials.203 In the same way, guests in a home,
199. Id. at 474.
200. Id. at 475. According to the Court:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its protec-
tion applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly
show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sover-
eign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other
than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his prop-
erty, subject to the right of seizure by process duly issued.
In the present case the record clearly shows that no official of the
Federal Government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of
the petitioner's property, or any knowledge thereof until several
months after the property had been taken from him and was in the
possession of the Cities Service Company. It is manifest that there
was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable search and seizure, as whatever wrong was done
was the act of individuals in taking the property of another. A por-
tion of the property so taken and held was turned over to the prose-
cuting officers of the Federal Government. We assume that petitioner
has an unquestionable right of redress against those who illegally and
wrongfully took his private property under the circumstances herein
disclosed, but with such remedies we are not now concerned.
Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
203. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-89 (1971). In Coo-
lidge, a murder suspect's wife, who was questioned in her home by police
about guns and clothing owned by her husband, produced those items, presum-
ably for the purpose of exonerating him. Id. at 489. The Court rejected the
husband's argument that the police conduct constituted a search. According to
the Court: "The test ... is whether Mrs. Coolidge, in light of all the circum-
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spotting items that connect their host to criminality, may re-
port the host to government officials with no fourth amend-
ment ramifications. The fourth amendment is inapplicable, but
not because the owner lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the home, nor because the owner has, to a limited degree,
exposed the home to public view. Rather, no protection is
available to the homeowner simply because the fourth amend-
ment does not apply to nongovernmental actions.204
The Supreme Court elaborated on the private party search
doctrine in United States v. Jacobsen.205 In Jacobsen, employ-
ees of a private freight carrier discovered a white, powdery sub-
stance in a multi-layered package that was damaged by a
forklift.206 The employees notified the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) and replaced the bags of powder in the lay-
ers of packaging, so that the powder could not be seen without
reopening the package. 20 7 A DEA agent arrived and reopened
the package, revealing the narcotics; after the addressee of the
package was charged with a crime, he argued that the search
was illegal under the fourth amendment.208 The Supreme
Court, after recognizing that letters, packages, and sealed par-
cels are cloaked with a reasonable expectation of privacy,209
held that the agent's reopening was not a search requiring a
warrant or any other fourth amendment protection because the
scope of his search did not exceed the scope of the prior private
party search.210 In other words, when a private party discovers
evidence of criminality and turns it over to police, there is no
protectable privacy interest from a subsequent governmental
intrusion that does not exceed the degree of intrusiveness of
the private party's search.211
The Court's decision in Jacobsen is fully consistent with
Justice Harlan's two-part test. The Court did not rule that the
accidental exposure to public view in Jacobsen affected the
stances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an 'instrument' or
agent of the state w.hen she produced her husband's belongings." Id. at 487.
204. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
205. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
206. Id. at 111.
207. I&
208. Id at 111-12.
209. Id at 114.
210. Id. at 115-17.
211. According to the Court: "The Fourth Amendment is implicated only
if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of pri-
vacy has not already been frustrated." Id. at 117. And, "[t]he additional inva-
sions of respondents' privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the
degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search." Id. at 115.
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package owner's subjective expectation of privacy. Neither did
the Court rule that privacy expectations in packages and letters
are objectively unreasonable because members of the public
might open them or might see what is inside if those packages
open accidentally. Had government agents, prior to the .private
party intrusion, affirmatively opened packages looking for
drugs, there is no doubt that the fourth amendment's reasona-
bleness requirement would have regulated their investigation,
requiring a warrant based on probable cause.2 1 2 In light of the
private party search in Jacobsen, however, the government's
subsequent search was not sufficiently intrusive to require
fourth amendment coverage. Moreover, nongovernmental ac-
tors already had destroyed any initially legitimate expectations
of privacy in the package. 21
3
The private party search cases and the interpretation of
Katz proposed in this Article indicate that the exposure of per-
sonal items to members of the public can deprive individuals of
fourth amendment protection in two ways. First, individuals
may forfeit fourth amendment protection by knowingly expos-
ing personal items to the public in a manner reflecting the lack
of a subjective privacy expectation.2 14 Second, if nongovern-
mental parties, accidentally or otherwise, discover private infor-
mation and expose it to government officials, the fourth
amendment ceases to protect the formerly private informa-
tion.2 15 This second type of "exposure" deprives individuals of
fourth amendment protection only when the subsequent gov-
ernmental search is no more intrusive than the search by the
private parties.21 6
It would trivialize the fourth amendment to extend its pro-
tections to unintrusive government conduct occurring sub-
sequently to either of these two types of "exposure." Never-
theless, the two situations are different-the first is not a
search because it does not meet the Katz requirements for pro-
tectable privacy interests; the second is not a search because
nongovernmental parties have destroyed privacy interests that
were, until the private party search, worthy of fourth amend-
212. See id. at 114 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809-12 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762
(1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 & n.8 (1977); United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970)).
213. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117, 119, 121.
214. See supra notes 128-33, 164-75, 195-96 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 197-213 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
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ment protection from unreasonable governmental intrusions.
The Supreme Court has confused these two different theories
of exposure, however, employing the rationale of the latter to
cases concerning the former.
An excellent illustration of this confusion is Greenwood, in
which the Court stated that the trash collector himself might
have sorted through the trash and turned it over to police.
217 It
is true that if Greenwood's trash collector, without police en-
couragement, actually had discovered incriminating items in
the garbage and turned them over to the police, the private
party search doctrine of Burdeau and Jacobsen would render
fourth amendment protections inapplicable to subsequent po-
lice inspection of the garbage, as long as the scope of the police
search did not exceed that of the trash collector's search. The
mere possibility, however, that a private party might search
and report should not preclude fourth amendment protection
under either the private party search doctrine or, as previously
and extensively discussed, the Katz formula.21 8 Neither doc-
trine involves playing such a guessing game.
By the same token, there is an inherent distinction be-
tween a nongovernmental airplane passenger who flies over a
fenced backyard, spots marijuana, and tells the police, and a
government-conducted aerial surveillance targeting that same
backyard. 219 The former is not a search implicating fourth
217. See California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1629 (1988).
218. See supra notes 165-73, 191-94 and accompanying text.
219. An analogous distinction was argued to the Court in Ciraolo, but sum-
marily dismissed. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 n.2 (1986).
The Ciraolo Court rejected any distinction between a routine police aerial
patrol that inadvertently discloses marijuana and a patrol focused on a particu-
lar individual's curtilage. Such a distinction has merit, however. For example,
if police are patrolling a highway for speeders and they inadvertently spot
drugs on someone's property along the highway, it would be absurd to suggest
that such inadvertent discovery is a search implicating fourth amendment pro-
tections. A ruling that the fourth amendment applies in that situation might
require police to obtain judicial approval prior to "intruding" on those individ-
uals whose curtilage is adjacent to the highway. Moreover, if such police high-
way surveillance is regular and routine, the people living along the highway
probably do not have a subjective expectation of privacy in their curtilage.
When police focus on a particular person's land, however, as they did in
Ciraolo, they take a much closer look at private activities than do commercial
passengers on an occasional overflying plane or police officers on routine high-
way patrol. Thus, although the possibility exists that members of the public or
police officers on routine traffic patrol might observe private activities in a
manner that does not implicate fourth amendment protection, a conscious in-
trusion by police into an area associated with intimate family activities, such
as the curtilage, should trigger the amendment's reasonableness requirement.
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amendment protection, according to Burdeau; but neither Bur-
deau nor Katz render the latter governmental search immune
from fourth amendment regulation. In the governmental
search, there is no private party involved, and the curtilage
owner's subjective expectation of privacy is worthy of protec-
tion because of the highly private nature of curtilage activities
and the significant intrusiveness of government air surveillance
directed at that area.
In sum, when members of the public actually see and re-
port criminal items or activities, subsequent police investiga-
tions do not implicate the fourth amendment, so long as the
degree of governmental intrusion does not exceed that of the
nongovernmental snoop. The mere possibility, however, that
members of the public might see and report intimate informa-
tion is irrelevant to the Burdeau doctrine. Moreover, such
speculation should not preclude fourth amendment protection
under Katz unless both the risk and degree of public exposure
is so great that any police surveillance of those exposed activi-
ties becomes too unintrusive to regulate and any individual pri-
vacy interest too insignificant to protect.
2. A Proposed Test for Determining the Legitimacy of
Privacy Expectations
Although the Burdeau-Jacobsen private party search doc-
trine and the Katz formula are distinct issues, the Jacobsen case
suggests a helpful test for determining when knowing exposure
to public view renders personal items unprotected by the
fourth amendment under Katz's two-part test. The key inquiry
should be whether police have intruded on highly personal as-
pects of an individual's life to a greater degree than those mem-
bers of the public to whom the individual knowingly has
exposed such personal data. If the governmental intrusion is
greater, the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement
should regulate that intrusion. All of the Katz elements coa-
lesce in such a case. A limited degree of exposure to public
view is not inconsistent with an individual's subjective expecta-
tion that certain privacies will not be destroyed by governmen-
tal intrusions far more extensive than those effected by
members of the public to whom there has been a small degree
of "exposure." Furthermore, when the degree of governmental
intrusion far exceeds the degree to which individuals have ex-
posed personal items and activities to public view, that govern-
mental surveillance is very intrusive, destroying individual
privacy interests which survive limited public "exposure." In
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other words, exposure of private activities to public view may
be completely consistent with subjective expectations of privacy
that are objectively worthy of fourth amendment protection.
The legitimacy of such privacy expectations depends on several
factors related to the "exposure" involved:
1) How great is the risk of public exposure?
2) How extensive is the public exposure?
3) Who are the members of the public to whom the indi-
viduals have exposed activities or items, and how close a look at
personal activities do the individuals expect the "viewing"
members of the public to take?
a. Risk of Exposure
The risk of public exposure is particularly relevant to
whether an individual harbors a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. Individuals who build fences around their backyards
before sunbathing in the nude have risked public exposure to a
far smaller degree than those nude sunbathers who have not
built enclosures. Only people without fences have knowingly
exposed their curtilage activities to public view to such a degree
that they have manifested no subjective expectation of privacy;
and even if "unfenced" individuals actually expect privacy, soci-
ety would not recognize that expectation as reasonable or wor-
thy of fourth amendment protection. Although the nature of
the privacy interest in curtilage activity is strong, any govern-
mental viewing of that which is completely in the open is not
intrusive enough to merit constitutional regulation.
The very language of Katz-"knowingly exposes to the
public"-connotes an assessment of risk and indicates that tak-
ing lesser risks of exposure-reckless, negligent, or accidental
exposure-should not absolutely preclude extension of fourth
amendment safeguards. Thus, the possibility that a scavenger
might rummage through an individual's garbage does not jus-
tify the conclusion that the individual has not sufficiently
sought to preserve the privacy of personal, yet disposable items.
That the risk of exposure is slight provides evidence of a sub-
jective expectation of privacy that is worthy of protection, so
long as the nature of the individual interest and the degree of
governmental intrusion coalesce to make that subjective expec-
tation objectively reasonable. As previously suggested, the
often intimate nature of discarded letters, bills, magazines, and
prophylactic devices, and the intrusiveness of government mon-
itoring of those materials, demand a conclusion that subjective
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expectations of privacy in discarded personal effects are reason-
able and therefore entitled to some fourth amendment
protection. 220
b. Extensiveness of Exposure
The extensiveness of exposure factor recognizes that an in-
dividual may expose private items to a limited number of peo-
ple without forfeiting fourth amendment protection. For
example, a hotel room is sufficiently like a home that individu-
als reasonably can expect privacy there, at least until check-
out.2 2 1 The nature of the privacy interest in a bedroom-even a
temporary bedroom-is significant, and any police entry into
that room would be highly intrusive. In other words, it is the
type of interest that deserves fourth amendment protection in
the form of a warrant based on probable cause prior to any gov-
ernmental intrusion. Nevertheless, most people realize that
during the course of a long hotel stay, housekeeping personnel
will enter daily to change the linens and clean the room.
Under the Court's recent fourth amendment jurisprudence,
this limited "knowing" exposure to members of the public ar-
guably could render all privacy expectations in hotel rooms
unprotectable.
Of course, housekeeping personnel who actually see items
tying the occupant of the room to criminality may freely report
their discovery to the police. The fourth amendment does not
regulate such observation of the occupant's private articles be-
cause it is a private party search under Burdeau.22 2 Moreover,
if the police search the room immediately on the heels of such
a private party search and do not exceed the scope of that ear-
lier search, the police investigation does not implicate the
fourth amendment, according to Jacobsen.223
220. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
221. See United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1975); LAFAVE,
supra note 60, § 3.2, at 102 (stating that "unconsented police entry into a ...
house, apartment, or hotel or motel room, constitutes a search under Katz");
see also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964) (finding pre-Katz case
in that guest in hotel room is entitled to fourth amendment protection).
222. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
223. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1984). Even if the
police do not exceed the scope of the earlier "intrusion" by housekeeping per-
sonnel, however, an argument exists that the officers' subsequent search im-
plicates the fourth amendment. Unlike Jacobsen, where the subsequent
governmental search of the already opened packages of white powder uncov-
ered no private information not revealed by the initial private party search,
any entry into a hotel room after the housekeeper has left can be viewed as a
completely distinct intrusion threatening as yet undestroyed privacy interests.
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Nevertheless, it would be an absurd bootstrap to suggest
that the mere possibility of private party crimesolving renders
government-initiated intrusions into a highly private area im-
mune from fourth amendment regulation. The result would be
a significant diminution of privacy in hotel rooms. Because all
hotel guests knowingly expose their rooms to housekeeping
personnel, the police would be able to intrude into hotel rooms
without any constitutional limitations. Such a result would be
blatantly inconsistent with the spirit of Katz and the essence of
the fourth amendment. The reasoning underlying the Supreme
Court's recent holdings, however, supports the view that indi-
viduals must maintain absolute solitude in private places if
those individuals are to receive even a modicum of fourth
amendment protection. Such a superficial approach threatens
even the privacies of the home.
Exposure of private areas and activities to limited numbers
of people is not inconsistent with a subjective expectation of
privacy that society would deem worthy of protection. A
Supreme Court imposed mandate of absolute solitude threatens
individual freedoms as much as its alternative-unlimited, arbi-
trary governmental intrusions on privacy. At best, the Court's
current approach exalts form over substance; at worst, it
threatens to reduce individual privacy to an intolerable level.
Exposure of privacies to limited, chosen members of the
public should not preclude fourth amendment protection if gov-
ernmental actions intrude to a greater degree than those mem-
bers of the public to whom such privacies knowingly have been
exposed. When individuals expose items or activities to limited
numbers of the public, subsequent governmental intrusion can
exceed the scope of the prior "intrusion" in both a quantitative
and qualitative sense. To use the hotel illustration, knowing
exposure of the room to housekeeping personnel should not de-
feat fourth amendment expectations under Katz. Any subse-
quent police intrusion is obviously greater quantitatively,
because more than one person now has viewed a private area.
By the same token, inviting guests into a home should not
render privacy expectations in that home unworthy of protec-
tion from subsequent, arbitrary governmental intrusions be-
For example, sometime after the room has been cleaned, the occupants pre-
sumably will return to the hotel room and engage in any number of intimate
activities. The occupants' privacy expectations concerning these intimate ac-
tivities have not been destroyed by the cleaning of the room. Thus, any subse-
quent entry by government officials could-and should-be viewed as a new
intrusion rather than-as in Jacobsen-merely a repetitious intrusion.
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cause the degree of governmental intrusion exceeds, in a
quantitative sense, the degree to which those individuals have
chosen to expose their home life.
Far more important, however, is the qualitative degree to
which subsequent governmental intrusion into home or hotel
room exceeds the prior, limited public exposure. First, it is dif-
ficult to view invited guests or hotel employees as "intruders."
When individuals have control over who will share their priva-
cies, it makes no sense to say that those individuals have relin-
quished their privacy expectations by exercising that control,
unless privacy really does mean "absolute solitude." The ordi-
nary American usage of privacy plainly contradicts such a con-
notation. Private parties, private conversations, private
meetings, and private clubs all connote the presence of several
people. One of the essential components of privacy in any of
these settings is not solitude but the ability to choose those
with whom to share business or personal intimacies. Therefore,
it is not the voluntary exposure of intimacies to chosen mem-
bers of the public that destroys privacy; rather, it is uninvited
governmental intrusion that destroys privacy by destroying that
freedom of choice.
Moreover, governmental intrusions subsequent to limited
"knowing exposures" are qualitatively more significant in a
temporal sense. At the time housekeeping personnel clean the
room, the occupants are not present in a state of undress, pas-
sion, or other intimacy. The same cannot be said at times after
the room has been cleaned; and these subsequent temporal ex-
pectations of privacy deserve fourth amendment protection
from unreasonable governmental intrusion. In other words,
knowingly exposing one's room to a housekeeper in the after-
noon certainly should not render illegitimate those privacy ex-
pectations that exist later in the evening. The same is true
regarding guests invited into a home. Even if one could say
that the hosts have relinquished a degree of privacy by inviting
friends into their home, the expectation of privacy regarding in-
timacies commonly shared in the home which existed before
the guests' arrival continues, in the same degree, after the
guests depart.
Thus, the Court should not interpret limited public expo-
sures as wholly depriving individuals of fourth amendment pro-
tection. Rather, the Court should assess whether and to what
extent the intrusiveness of governmental surveillance exceeds
the observations of those limited members of the public to
whom an individual knowingly has exposed private activities or
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enclaves. Certainly, at some point, the exposure of privacies to
the public can be so extensive that society will cease to deem
privacy expectations reasonable, and any subsequent govern-
mental action will be unintrusive. The ultimate question is
whether, given the nature, degree, and extent of public expo-
sure, society would consider an individual's expectation of pri-
vacy worthy of protection from arbitrary, unlimited
governmental intrusions of the type involved.
c. Who and How Close?
This aspect of the proposed "degrees of exposure" analysis
is the one most often ignored by the Supreme Court in its re-
cent fourth amendment decisions.224 In determining whether
knowing exposure to public view renders privacy expectations
unprotectable, the Court exalts form over substance when it ig-
nores the identity of those to whom the knowing exposure is
made and how closely they may be expected to look at the
privacies so exposed. There are some people whose observa-
tions of life's privacies are too unintrusive to protect against.
Their view is out of focus. They simply will not look at those
intimacies in a way that defeats the nature of the privacy ex-
pected by the average individual. Governmental surveillance
subsequent to such limited exposure is therefore often highly
intrusive, threatening significant privacy interests. The cases of
Smith, Knotts, and Greenwood are excellent examples.
The individual in Smith knowingly exposed the numbers
dialed from his telephone only to people who were going to use
those numbers for billing purposes, 225 hardly a relinquishment
of any significant privacy interests. Smith's expectation of pri-
vacy regarding the names and faces of the people he called is
completely consistent with his knowing exposure of the sterile
numbers to the telephone company. This type of limited expo-
sure does not undercut either aspect of Justice Harlan's Katz
test and should not result in a relinquishment of fourth amend-
ment protection. The subsequent governmental intrusion, how-
ever, far exceeded the limited exposure of the numbers and
destroyed the only type of privacy Smith cared about when he
dialed the telephone-the privacy associated with the identities
of the people called and the frequency of those calls. The sig-
224. See supra notes 76-80, 89-91 and accompanying text; infra notes 225-28
and accompanying text.
225. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). For a complete discussion
and critique of Smith, see supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
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nificant nature of the privacy interest-the names rather than
the numbers-and the intrusiveness of the governmental sur-
veillance coalesce to suggest that the privacy interest in Smith
is one which society would deem deserving of some fourth
amendment protection from unreasonable governmental
intrusions.
In Knotts, the individual knowingly exposed only tiny seg-
ments of his travels to members of the public who neither
knew him nor cared where he was going.226 This public obser-
vation did not defeat any expectations of privacy regarding des-
tinations, meetings, or acquaintances-the type of privacy that
people care about when traveling from place to place. Thus,
the relevant privacy interest was unexposed until the govern-
ment, using beeper surveillance, intruded on the individual's
privacy interest and destroyed it. The government intruded to
a far greater degree than those members of the public to whom
the individual exposed small portions of his trip. The differ-
ence between the public's view of personal travels and the gov-
ernment's view in Knotts parallels the difference between a
single film frame and an entire motion picture. The nature of
the privacy interest in Knotts and the high degree of govern-
mental intrusion strongly suggest a situation to which the
fourth amendment should apply, requiring the government to
act reasonably.
Most recently, in Greenwood, an individual knowingly ex-
posed his trash only to members of the public scavenging for
recyclable cans or looking for clothing or scraps of food.
227
Such a limited public observation does not intrude on the pri-
vacy expected by the average individual-an expectation that
goes far beyond freedom from indiscriminate rummaging. Be-
cause scavengers do not view personal items in a way that
defeats privacy interests, their observation is not sufficiently in-
trusive for individuals to guard against. On the other hand, a
systematic governmental exploration of trash, not for recycl-
able cans or needed clothing, but for intimate details about an
individual's life inside his home, involves a much greater degree
of intrusion than the scavengers' observation. Thus, it is not
the risk of limited and unfocused public observation by scav-
engers that destroys the type of privacy that individuals reason-
226. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). For a complete dis-
cussion and critique of Knofts, see supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
227. See California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988). For a complete
discussion and critique of Greenwood. see supra notes 145-81.
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ably expect, but rather the actual, highly intrusive
governmental search. The speculative "exposure" of garbage to
scavengers is simply irrelevant to the Katz analysis. Indeed, in
light of the type of privacy expected-freedom from discovery
of, and association of the individual with, the intimate details
present in refuse-any knowing exposure to scavengers neither
defeats that subjective expectation of privacy nor renders it un-
worthy of protection from unreasonable governmental
searches. Given the significant intrusiveness of governmental
searches of trash and the importance of privacy expectations
concerning activities in the home, garbage searches belong to
the class of searches that the fourth amendment was designed
to regulate.
It is true that the scavenger who actually finds evidence of
criminality may freely turn it over to the police. The scaven-
ger's view is not one that the fourth amendment regulates-it
is a private party search under Burdeau.228 Nevertheless, the
mere possibility that a scavenger might search an individual's
trash is irrelevant to Burdeau and should be irrelevant to the
Katz inquiry into whether expectations of privacy deserve pro-
tection from unreasonable governmental surveillance.
In Smith, Knotts, and Greenwood, the nature of the privacy
interest was significant and the type of privacy expected re-
mained intact despite limited exposure to the public. In each
case, the degree of governmental intrusion far exceeded the de-
gree of the individuals' knowing public exposure of privacies.
In view of the type of privacy expected, the limited knowing
exposures to the public were not inconsistent with subjective
expectations of privacy that society would deem objectively
worthy of protection. These cases illustrate that it is only after
identifying the type of privacy expected that the Court can de-
termine whether an individual knowingly has exposed items to
public view in a manner that defeats the privacy interest and
removes fourth amendment protection. If-like the individuals
in Smith, Knotts, and Greenwood-an individual has not so ex-
posed personal items, any subsequent governmental surveil-
lance that intrudes on an important intact privacy expectation
demands fourth amendment control if the constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is to have
any meaning at all.





In Katz v. United States,229 the Supreme Court redirected
the course of fourth amendment law. By focusing on privacy
interests rather than property interests, the Court construed
fourth amendment protections in a manner that gave individu-
als protection against the government's use of modern technol-
ogy in criminal investigations. The last decade of fourth
amendment law, however, demonstrates that the Supreme
Court has drifted further and further away from Katz, both in
law and philosophy. As advancing technology continually in-
creases the ability of the government to intrude into individu-
als' personal lives, the Court has not correspondingly adjusted
the scope of fourth amendment protection to regulate govern-
mental intrusions. Rather, the Court has decreased the scope
of the fourth amendment and with it the realm of privacy avail-
able to American citizens. With its decision in California v.
Greenwood,2 30 the Court finally has invited the government
into citizens' homes by withholding fourth amendment protec-
tion from discarded personal effects that reveal extensive infor-
mation about the private life carried on inside the home.
The most disturbing aspect of the Court's recent fourth
amendment voyage toward a new world of little privacy is its
perverse use of Katz to chart that course. By pulling one
phrase from Katz out of context, and interpreting the phrase
literally, without regard as to its original meaning, the Court
has rewritten fourth amendment law in a way that casts doubt
even on the continued validity of its seminal case. The Court
has interpreted Katz strictly according to its letter, but in com-
plete contradiction to its spirit. The current state of the law, af-
ter Greenwood, is that the fourth amendment does not protect
any item or enclave which individuals have "exposed" in such a
way that members of the public "might" view it. Such an ap-
proach, of course, completely neglects the two factors that
courts must consider if the fourth amendment is to be a living
right-the nature of the privacy interest implicated by the gov-
ernmental surveillance and the intrusiveness of that surveil-
lance. When these two factors sufficiently coalesce-for
example, highly intrusive governmental surveillance of an im-
portant individual privacy interest-the fourth amendment,
with its requirement of reasonableness, must regulate that gov-
ernmental conduct. To find otherwise is to render the fourth
229. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
230. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
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amendment meaningless in an age when the government,
through the use of modern technology, has the capacity to de-
stroy personal privacy.
The key question in modern fourth amendment jurispru-
dence should be whether an individual has exposed items and
private activities to the public in a manner that renders privacy
interests unworthy of protection. Rather than exalting form
over substance by superficially looking to the fact of exposure,
or worse, the mere possibility of exposure, the Court should
adopt a more exacting approach that weighs the nature and de-
gree of the exposure. Such an approach should focus on the
factors discussed in this Article, including: the degree of risk
that the public may view intimacies; the extensiveness of public
exposure; the identity of the viewing members of the public;
and the nature of the public's intrusion. The Court's current
mechanical, literal approach to Katz ignores these factors, re-
sulting in an application of Katz that undercuts the spirit of the
fourth amendment.
Adopting the new model proposed in this Article will en-
sure that fourth amendment regulation is available to address
egregious abuses of governmental power. Instead, the Court
has chosen to interpret the fourth amendment to provide no
controls over intrusive forms of police surveillance such as
tracking a person's travels, tracing telephone calls, flying over
backyards with cameras, and even sorting through discarded
bills, letters, reading materials, and contraceptive devices. It is
no' answer for the Court to respond that it can broaden the
scope of the fourth amendment in the event that arbitrary and
flagrant governmental intrusions become the future norm.
Such a judicial response not only begs the constitutional ques-
tion, it reverses the presumption that motivated the framers to
include a Bill of Rights. The framers added the Bill of Rights
to the Constitution because they distrusted governmental
power. To interpret constitutional protections as existing only
subsequent to clear indications that the government cannot po-
lice itself is to rewrite history and reverse the founding fathers'
presumption.
Individual freedoms are the foundation of American soci-
ety and it is the Court's role to tend that foundation, repairing
and rebuilding it to prevent the erosion of existing liberties,
and even expanding it when necessary to meet the needs of the
future. When the Court neglects this role, it upsets the delicate
balance between the government's power to enforce its laws
and society's interest in private enclaves free from governmen-
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tal intrusion. Waiting for Big Brother to arrive before inter-
preting the Constitution to protect citizens from him risks
sacrificing the time-honored individual privacy interests that
distinguish this nation from others.
Finally, the Court can implement the broader construction
of fourth amendment rights proposed in this Article at little
cost to legitimate law enforcement activities. Just as individu-
als may expose aspects of their personal lives to the public in
varying degrees, so may courts apportion the protections sup-
plied by the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement
in varying degrees. All the restrictions necessary to make
searches of homes reasonable may not be necessary to consti-
tute reasonable air surveillance, reasonable telephone call trac-
ing, or reasonable garbage searching. Thus, when the Court
concludes that a particular privacy interest is not as significant
as the privacy interest in a home, the most accurate constitu-
tional response is less fourth amendment protection rather
than no protection at all.
In conclusion, the Court's current fourth amendment anal-
ysis is based on simplistic and logically incorrect theories of
public exposure. The time has come for the Court to take a
more intellectually demanding approach when delineating the
scope of protection from unreasonable governmental searches.
The importance of personal privacy in the structure of our soci-
ety's freedom demands no less. The model proposed in this Ar-
ticle is a beginning-a means of interpreting and applying Katz
consistently with both the spirit of that venerable decision and
the essence of the fourth amendment.
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